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I. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
A number of important decisions were rendered during the survey pe-
riod in both the federal and Texas state courts. A bid to amend the Code
of Judicial Ethics to permit cameras in the courtroom was resoundingly
defeated and the 67th Legislature passed a number of laws requiring cer-
tain government information to be confidential. Amendments to the Open
Meetings Act were vetoed by Governor Clements and the attorney general
responded to numerous inquiries as to whether government information
must be divulged. Generally, the public's rights to government informa-
tion were restricted during the survey period.
Courtroom Evidence. The previous survey of local government law re-
ported that Judge Robert O'Connor, Jr. of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas had denied the application of two Dallas
television stations to obtain contemporaneous access, or in the alternative,
access after trial, to certain audiotapes that had been introduced into evi-
dence by the government in its prosecution of Billy Clayton, Speaker of
the Texas House of Representatives.' Judge O'Connor denied permission
to copy the tapes during trial and again after the trial because an addi-
tional defendant, L.G. Moore, had been severed from the main trial.2
Moore's voice appeared on virtually all of the tapes and the court held that
release of the tapes to the electronic media would prejudice Moore's rights
to a fair trial.3 Both television stations appealed and the Fifth Circuit
granted expedited review of the question.4 Although Moore did not, at
any time, object to the release of the tapes, and although none of the appel-
lees filed briefs on the merits or appeared at oral argument, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court.5
* A.B., Brown University; J.D., Boston University. Attorney at Law, Jackson,
Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
** A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Locke, Pur-
nell, Boren, Laney & Neely, Dallas, Texas.
1. Babcock & Collins, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw.
L.J. 409, 412 (1981).
2. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, No. H-80-2320, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 1980).
3. Id at 2.
4. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981).
5. Id at 434.
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The Fifth Circuit held that there was no right of access to the audiotapes
grounded in the first amendment to the United States Constitution.6 The
court recognized that there was a common law right of access for the pub-
lic and the press to inspect and copy documents introduced into evidence
which predated the Constitution, but ruled that whether to give effect to
that common law right was within the discretion of the trial judge.7 The
court finding that Judge O'Connor had not abused his discretion in weigh-
ing a perceived threat to Moore's fair trial rights more heavily than the
right to access, stated:
The broadcasters' argument that the concern for defendant Moore's
fair trial rights was exaggerated beyond proper proportion is ad-
dressed to an audience in perhaps the worst possible position to make
that judgment: appellate courts are far removed in time and space
from the events in the course of criminal trials. And while distance
may allow us to escape the smoke and heat generated in those pro-
ceedings, our distance from the flame robs us as well of the light cast
thereby.8
What the Fifth Circuit fails to mention is that there was no fire in the
court below-only smoke. Nowhere at any time did Moore allege that his
fair trial rights would be implicated by the copying of the tapes. The gov-
ernment never opposed the right of the television stations to copy the ma-
terial, nor did the defendants who were tried and acquitted with
Representative Clayton. The only reference in the record that conceivably
could support objection by anyparty was Representative Clayton's attor-
ney's acknowledgement, in a response to Judge O'Connor's observation
that Mr. Moore remained to be tried.9 Although none of the appellees,
including Moore, filed briefs, Clayton's attorney did file a letter with the
court prior to oral argument which stated: "It has been our position that
the Court was correct in its ruling since L.G. Moore was yet to be tried.
But, we do not feel any reason to make an appearance in this matter either
by filing a brief or by oral argument."' 0 Shortly before oral argument, the
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas sent a
letter to the court stating:
As per our earlier telephone discussions, I have endeavored to com-
municate with the attorneys of the other parties herein and advise you
of their intentions. Messrs. Minton, Burton and Fitzgerald of Austin,
Texas; Messrs. Levey and Goldstein of San Antonio, Texas; and
Messrs. Pape and Mallett of Houston, Texas, represented the parties
to the prosecution other than L.G. Moore. They have all been acquit-
ted. Mr. Michael Ramsey of Houston, Texas, represents L.G. Moore,
who was severed and not tried. The indictment remains pending as to
6. Id at 427-28.
7. Id at 429.
8. Id at 431.
9. Record at 68, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, No. H-80-2320, (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
1980).
10. Letter from Roy Q. Minton to the Honorable Gilbert Ganucheau (March 9, 1981)
(on file with Southwestern Law Journal).
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him. It appears that none of these parties are [sic] now interested in
defending the judge's (O'Connor) order, or intend to file briefs herein.
It thus appears that the case will be submitted on appellant's briefs
only and that no one will appear for oral argument on the side of the
appellee. While I hesitate to formally suggest mootness or any partic-
ularly summary action in the absence of any direct statements from
these other parties to the Court, I feel called upon to advise you of the
situation, in order that the Court may ake action as it deems
appropriate. "
The broadcasters argued that even if the court sua sfponte considered
Moore's fair trial rights, nevertheless the abuse of discretion standard was
inappropriate because there was a presumption in favor of access. The
Third Circuit in In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co. found that
a decision on release of Abscan videotapes "is not accorded the review
reserved for discretionary decisions based on first hand observations" of
the trial judge.' 2 In addition, the Second and D.C. Circuits held that the
presumption of access to courtroom evidence could be overcome for only
the most compelling reasons.' 3 The Fifth Circuit declined to follow these
cases, stating that there was no support for their holdings and that they had
misread pertinent United States Supreme Court precedents.' 4 The Fifth
Circuit read the Supreme Court case of Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions15 as recognizing that a number of factors may militate against public
access. The court relied primarily upon the footnotes in Justice Powell's
majority opinion in Warner in which Justice Powell tracked the history of
the common law right of access to courtroom evidence and chronicled var-
ious situations in which access had been denied.' 6
One of the themes of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Clark was that both
the print and electronic media had been permitted to attend the trial and
had been given written transcripts of the tape recordings.' 7 Following the
Fifth Circuit's opinion, United States District Judge Norman W. Black of
the Southern District of Texas ordered the parties to a criminal prosecu-
tion not to turn over even the transcripts of potential evidence.' 8 The
court, citing Clark, stated that release of transcripts would deny the de-
fendant the right to a fair trial, potentially might deny rights guaranteed by
the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution, and would hamper
the court in selecting a fair and impartial jury. 19
Courtrooms. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia the United States
11. Letter from James R. Gough to the Honorable Gilbert Ganucheau (March 6, 1981)
(on file with Southwestern Law Journal).
12. 648 F.2d 814, 818 (3rd Cir. 1981).
13. In reApplication of Nat' Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re
Application of Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
14. 654 F.2d at 431.
15. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
16. 654 F.2d at 428.
17. Id at 427, 432.




Supreme Court held that there was a first amendment right to attend crim-
inal trials.20 The Supreme Court also recently granted a petition for certi-
orari to review the constitutionality of a Massachusetts state statute barring
the public from juvenile proceedings involving sex crimes.21
In Texas, access to both civil and criminal proceedings is also constitu-
tionally mandated. Article I, § 13, provides: "All courts shall be open
.... "22 This provision has never been construed by a Texas court in a
courtroom access case, but "[tjhe uniform interpretation of the 'all courts
shall be open' language [in other state constitutions] is that the language
confers an independent right of the public to attend court proceedings." 23
Several recent Texas cases, however, have dealt with the right to access.
In Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Vascocu24 the Lufkin News and its editor filed
a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court attempting to
require a district judge to open pretrial civil proceedings. The district
judge had closed the proceedings in a shareholders' derivative action
brought against the directors of Texas National Bank seeking damages for
mismanagement and other relief. The proceedings in question were closed
pursuant to the bank directors' motion urging that "the cause at hand in-
volves sensitive and confidential matters impinging upon the operation
and reputation of a national bank association and the potential for dam-
ages to a national bank arousing from the mere airing of such
charges .... -25 The Lufiin News and its editor objected when the district
court granted the motion, and asked that the proceedings be open to the
public. The court denied the newspaper's request stating that the newspa-
per and the editor lacked standing to challenge the order because they
owned no stock in the bank.26 Furthermore, the judge did not believe the
public would be interested in nor would it understand the pretrial proceed-
ings.27 The Texas Supreme Court refused to file the petition for writ of
mandamus,28 and the Lufkin News appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
2 9
20. 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
21. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Ct., 423 N.E.2d 773 (Mass 1981),prob.yfurs. noted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3402 (1981).
22. TEX. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and
every person, for an injury done him, and his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law."
23. KFGO v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 511 (N.D. 1980).
24. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 578 (Oct. 1, 1981).
25. Record at 29, Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Vascocu, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 578 (Oct. 1,
1981). The action arose from the judge's ruling in Shelton v. McVicker, No. 18558-81-5
(Dist. Ct. of Angelina County, 217th Judicial Dist. of Texas, July 17, 1980).
26. Shelton v. McVicker, No. 18558-81-5 (Dist. Ct. of Angelina County, 217th Judicial
Dist. of Texas, July 17, 1980).
27. Record at 29, Cox Enterprises.
28. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 578.
29. 50 U.S.L.W. 3517 (1982). The Lufkin News also filed a declaratory judgment action
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That case was dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. Murray v. Leach, No. L-8-14 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1981).
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Access to Records. The Bryan-College Station Eagle requested from Texas
A&M University the names of candidates being considered for the presi-
dency of the university. The school refused to disclose the names claiming
an exemption from disclosure under the Texas Open Records Act.30 Pur-
suant to the Act, the school applied to the attorney general for an opinion
on whether the information had to be disclosed.
The attorney general upheld the claim of exemption under section
3(a)(l 1) of the Act with respect to the recommendations of a Search Advi-
sory Committee, but held that the list of candidates considered must be
disclosed. 31 The attorney general also ruled that a committee created by
the Board of Regents to search for a new president may make recommen-
dations to the board, and submit a list of candidates without fear of public
disclosure. 32 The university refused to comply with the attorney general's
decision, and the Eagle filed a mandamus action in state district court to
compel disclosure. 33 Following a trial, a writ of mandamus was issued
ordering the defendants to disclose the names. The case is currently on
appeal.34
No other reported cases during the survey period construed the Open
Records Act. 35 The attorney general, however, issued twenty-six opinions
on various aspects of the Act. These opinions are summarized below.
Attorney General Opinions. In 1979 the Urban Planning Department of the
City of Dallas conducted a job market survey to determine whether sala-
ries paid to city photographers and darkroom technicians were competitive
with private industry jobs. Among the information collected were salary
figures from several private employers. A set of longhand notes written by
a city employee reflecting the wage rate information obtained from the
private employers was the subject of ORD-256. 36 The attorney general
held that the longhand notes were excepted from disclosure by section
3(a)(10) of the Open Records Act.37 In addition, the attorney general held
that a memorandum summarizing the results of the survey with conclu-
sions and recommendations was exempted from disclosure under section
3(a)(l 1) of the Act except for factual information contained in the memo-
30. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
31. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-273 at 2 (1981).
32. Id at 3.
33. Harte-Hanks Tex. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hubert, No. 323884 (Dist. Ct. of Travis
County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Texas, July 27, 1981).
34. Id, appeailed, No. 13,580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981).
35. Several articles during the survey period dealt with related questions of access to
government records. See Brant, Public Records, FIPA and CORP How Massachusetts Bal-
ances Privacy and the Right to Know, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 23 (1981); Note, Developments
Under the Freedom ofInformation Act-1980-1981, 1981 DUKE L.J. 338; Note, The Defini-
tion of "Agency" Under the Freedom of Information Act as Applied to the Federal Consultants
and Grantees, 69 GEo. L.J. 1223 (1981); Note, Applying the Freedom ofInformation Act to
Tax Return Information, Zale Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service, 69 GEO. L.J. 1283 (1981);
Note, The Status ofLaw Enforcement Manuals Under the Freedom ofInformation Act, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 734 (1981).
36. TEx. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-256 (1980).
37. Id at 2; TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
1982]
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randum which did not identify individual companies, but merely related to
the average low range and average high range of various positions.38
In 1979 the attorney general ruled in ORD-223 that the Open Records
Act did not require the disclosure of applicants for school superintendent
if the applicant could demonstrate that release of his name was likely to
have an adverse effect on his current employment. 39 The decision was
based upon a lower level Florida appellate decision.40 That appellate deci-
sion was subsequently reversed by the Florida Supreme Court.41 The at-
torney general, therefore was asked in ORD 257, to reconsider his decision
in ORD 223.42
ORD-257 involved a request for information from both the Austin In-
dependent School District and the City of Plano, Texas. The Austin
American Statesman was seeking the names of unsuccessful applicants for
the position of school superintendent of the Austin Independent School
District. Plano was asked to disclose a list of finalists for the position of
chief of police. The attorney general ruled that there were three types of
"privacy" interests protected under the Open Records Act.43 The first,
constitutional privacy, is available only if the. subject matter relates to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, or child rearing and
education.44 The second, common law privacy, relates to information
which contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts that would be highly
objectionable to a reasonable person if published and, in addition, the in-
formation must be of no legitimate concern to the public.45 The third type
of privacy interest, recognized specifically by the Open Records Act, is in-
formation in personnel files which, if released, would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.46 ORD-223 relied upon the
third type of privacy interest. The attorney general determined that the
names of applicants for superintendent of schools of the Austin Independ-
ent School District and for chief of police of Plano were not excepted from
disclosure under any provision of the Open Records Act.47 In reaching
this result the attorney general specifically overruled ORD-223. 48 The
Austin Independent School District challenged the attorney general's opin-
ion in state district court.49
In ORD-258 the attorney general determined whether incident reports
38. TEx. ATr'y GEN. ORD-256, at 2.
39. Id ORD-223 (1979).
40. Id See Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State, 360 So. 2d 83 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
41. Schevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
42. T"x. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-257 (1980).




47. Id at 3.
48. Id
49. See Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Austin Indep. School Dist., No. 309534 (Dist. Ct. of
Travis County, 200th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Jan. 6, 1982) (declining to enjoin school district
upon district's promise to obey law in future).
[Vol. 36
LOCAL GOVERNVMENT LAW
filed by employees of the City of Irving Fire Department relating to trans-
portation of patients by a city operated medical service were excepted from
disclosure by reason of either a common law or constitutional right of pri-
vacy.50 The reports identified the patient, provided a physical description
of him, and described emergency treatment administered. The attorney
general held that the reports were not per se exempted from disclosure, but
directed the City of Irving to insure, before disclosure, that no report con-
tained information of a highly intimate or embarrassing nature of any in-
formation that would be highly Objectionable to a person of ordinary
sensibilities. 51 The attorney general listed as examples of intimate, embar-
rassing, or objectionable information treatment for childbirth, venereal
disease, female complaints, psychiatric conditions, or suicide attempts.
52
The attorney general refrained from specifically holding these would be
excepted under a privacy analysis, but stated they might raise an issue of a
common law or constitutional right of privacy.5 3
ORD-259 54 involved an anonymous pledge of a substantial sum of
money to the City of Fort Neches to build a library. The entire donation
was to be paid in cash on or before February 1, 1981, but the donor re-
quested that his pledge agreement be withheld from public disclosure. The
city attorney of Fort Neches requested an opinion from the attorney gen-
eral with respect to whether the donor's identity could be kept confidential
in light of the Open Records Act. Because the donor was not going to pay
the money until February 1, 1981, the attorney general construed the cir-
cumstances of the gift as "still under negotiation," -and held that since the
public could not be at a meeting to discuss the gift under section 2(f) of the
Open Meetings Act,55 allowing the identity of the owner to be disclosed
pursuant to the Open Records Act would be anomalous.56 Construing sec-
tion 2(f) of the Open Meetings Act as a law creating, confidential informa-
tion, the attorney general ruled that the City of Fort Neches need not
disclose the pledge agreement relating to the gift until the entire amount of
the gift was paid or not later than February 1, 1981. 57 Although the result
of the opinion is not surprising, the effect of the decision is to incorporate
the various exceptions to the Open Meetings Act into the Open Records
Act. Hopefully, the attorney general will resist similar opportunities in the
future and confine ORD-259 to its facts.
50. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-258 (1980).
51. Id at 1-2.
52. Id at 2.
53. Id
54. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-259 (1980).
55. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
The public may be excluded from that portion of a meeting during which a
discussion is had with respect to the purchase, exchange, lease, or value of real
property, negotiated contracts for prospective gifts or donations to the state or
the governmental body, when such discussion would have a detrimental effect
on the negotiating position of the governmental body as between such body
and a third person, firm, or corporation.
56. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-259, at 2 (1980).
57. Id
1982]
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In ORD-26058 the City of Irving appealed to the attorney general for an
opinion regarding whether certain information relating to a worker's com-
pensation claim against the City of Irving was available to the public. The
attorney general held that that portion of the record concerning the em-
ployee's alleged injury, the potential injuries of other employees, and in-
formation relating to the possible dangers of a particular chemical used by
the City could be withheld from public inspection in light of pending liti-
gation pursuant to exemption 3(a)(3).59 The remainder of the record con-
sisted of information regarding the employee's prior injuries and the City's
Safety Review Board accident sheets and personnel status change sheets
regarding other injuries which the City contended should be withheld
under the privacy exceptions. The attorney general overruled this
contention. 60
When the Texas Department of Banking forwards a report of examina-
tion to a state chartered bank, it includes for return a form acknowledge-
ment indicating that the bank's directors have received and reviewed the
report. If special comments are included as part of the report, a sentence is
stamped across the face of the acknowledgement indicating, "each of the
undersigned has read or caused to be read the letter of transmittal attached
hereto." Thus, the presence or absence of language stamped across the
acknowledgement letter indicates some of the conclusions reached by the
Department of Banking in its examination. After receiving a request for
this information, the Department of Banking sought an opinion from the
attorney general on whether the information should be disclosed. The at-
torney general applied section 3(a)(12) of the Open Records Act and held
that the information was exempt from disclosure. 6'
In ORD-262 62 the attorney general determined whether certain infor-
mation contained in reports filed by a municipally operated emergency
medical service was available to the public. The request sought disclosure
of data in four categories: (1) incident information such as date, pickup
location, type of run, person requesting ambulance, number of miles trav-
eled, and location where the patient was delivered; (2) patient information
including name, address, gender and age; (3) the names of the driver and
attendant and their respective level of training; and (4) a brief description
of the injury or illness with a check list indicating the probable cause and
type of injury and/or the suspected illness and the part of the body af-
fected. The attorney general held that all this information must be dis-
closed under the Open Records Act with the exception of certain types of
illnesses that are protected under a common law right of privacy.63
ORD-2636 involved an effort by the City of San Marcos to restrict ac-
58. TEx. ATr'y GEN. ORD-260 (1980).
59. Id
60. Id at 2.
61. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-261, at 2 (1980).
62. Thx. Ar'Y GEN. ORD-262 (1980).
63. Id at 2.
64. TEx. Arr'y GEN. ORD-263 (1981).
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cess to financial disclosure statements of certain city officials by enacting
an ordinance. The ordinance prohibited duplication of the financial state-
ments, and stated that "no publication shall be allowed" of the financial
statements. In order to inspect the file, the ordinance required that "a
sworn statement that gives reasonable details of why he or she believes a
certain employee or officer has a conflict of interest." The ordinance also
required that certain city officials be present during the examination of the
file. The attorney general held that these provisions violated the Open
Records Act and would therefore be of no effect.65
The attorney general in ORD-264, held that the names, addresses, and
qualifications of applications for the position of city director of public
safety were available to the public.66 Claimed exemptions under sections
3(a)(1), 3(a)(2), 3(a)(14), and 3(a)(17) were overruled except that the ad-
dresses of police officer applicants were held to be exempt from disclo-
sure.67 This opinion represented the first time that the attorney general
specifically held that the qualifications of applicants for public employ-
ment must be disclosed. The attorney general said that applicant qualifi-
cations could not be deemed to infringe upon the applicant's right of
privacy whether constitutional, common law, or employment related under
section 3(a)(2) of the Act. 68
ORD-26569 involved the question of whether information regarding the
site for a waste treatment facility was excepted from disclosure under the
Act. The attorney general ruled that a resolution at the Gulf Coast Dispo-
sal Authority that revealed the proposed location of a waste treatment
plant was excepted from disclosure by section 3(a)(5) of the Open Records
Act until purchase of the site had been completed. 70
In ORD-266 71 the attorney general considered whether two investigative
reports prepared by the San Antonio Fire Department concerning the ter-
mination of a probationary firefighter were exempt from disclosure. The
firefighter had filed a complaint of discrimination with the Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. San Antonio sought to withhold
the investigative reports pursuant to section 3(a)(3) because the informa-
tion related to litigation. The attorney general held that there was a rea-
sonable probability of litigation with respect to the terminated
probationary firefighter and, therefore, withholding the investigative re-
ports was reasonable.72
The Contra Valley Council of Governments sought to withhold an an-
nual report regarding an affirmative action plan. The attorney general re-
jected the claimed exemption in ORD-267 under section 3(a)(2), but stated
65. Id at 2.
66. TEx. Arr'y GEN. ORD-264, at 2 (1981).
67. Id
68. Id at 2.
69. TEx. ATr'y GEN. ORD-265 (1981).
70. Id at 2.
71. TEx. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-266 (1981).
72. Id at 1-2.
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that interoffice communications consisting of advice, opinions, and recom-
mendations could be withheld.73
Three types of information were requested from the Seguin Housing
Authority: (1) a listing of the addresses of housing units operated by pri-
vate landlords who participated in a housing subsidy program from Janu-
ary, 1979 through October, 1980; (2) a listing of the owners and managers
of these units; and (3) the total amounts paid by the authority to the owner
or manager from January, 1979 through October, 1980. The Seguin Hous-
ing authority operated two types of programs. In the first, the authority
acted as landlord and manager of apartment units. In the other program
the authority paid a monthly subsidy to private owners of apartment units
on behalf of tenants who met the income requirements established by the
Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.
In opposing the request, Seguin first contended that the housing author-
ity was not a "governmental body" within the meaning of the Open
Records Act, and the information was therefore exempt from disclosure.
The attorney general rejected this argument in ORD-268, even though the
housing authority received no revenues from the State of Texas,
Guadalupe County, the City of Seguin, or any other local taxing author-
ity. 74 The money the housing authority collected from rentals, according to
the attorney general, assumed "the character of public monies as soon as
they are paid to the authority.' '75 Seguin next contended that the informa-
tion requested was exempt as information deemed confidential by law.
The attorney general also rejected this contention and held that the consti-
tutional right of privacy was not implicated, and reaffirmed the oftstated
principal that "the scope of common law privacy is narrow indeed. '76
The Dallas Times Herald requested the University of Texas Health Sci-
ence Center at Dallas and the associate comptroller of the University of
Texas system to release information relating to the resignation of an indi-
vidual who was suspected of tampering with public monies. The gov-
erning body sought an attorney general's opinion as to whether the privacy
exception of the Act shielded the requested information from disclosure.
The attorney general, in ORD-269, noted that section 3(a)(2) had been
applied to permit withholding of information from the public concerning
the circumstances involved in termination of employment. 77 Distinguish-
ing those previous cases on the grounds that most of the information in-
volved in the instant situation related to the handling of public funds, the
attorney general ruled that the information must be disclosed. 78
In ORD-270 the requesting party sought an affidavit taken in connec-
tion with an investigative session of the Federal Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. Apparently, the affidavit came into the possession
73. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-267 (1981).
74. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-268, at 2 (1981).
75. Id
76. Id




of the city, that claimed the litigation exception of section 3(a)(3) and ap-
plied for an opinion from the attorney general. The attorney general
found that there was a reasonable likelihood of litigation, and that with-
holding the affidavit therefore was reasonable.
79
The Texas Department of Labor and Standards promulgated regula-
tions requiring contracts between promoters and boxers to be filed with the
department. A request was made for certain of these contracts, and in
ORD-271 the attorney general held that these contracts were public infor-
mation.80 The attorney general overruled contentions that the information
was exempted under sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(10) of the Act. 81
In ORD-272 82 the attorney general considered whether the results of a
blood alcohol test conducted on an injured Fort Worth police officer was
public information. The police officer was shot in the line of duty, taken to
a hospital, and given a blood alcohol test. He died the following day. The
contention that section 3(a)(1) applied on the grounds that the right of
privacy lapses upon death of the individual whose privacy is allegedly be-
ing protected was overruled by the attorney general.83 The attorney gen-
eral also overruled the contention that the test was exempted under 3(a)(8)
as a record of a law enforcement agency because an internal investigation
into the death of the officer by the Fort Worth Police Department had
been concluded. 84  The attorney general, therefore, ordered the test
disclosed. 85
The Wichita Falls' city attorney requested an opinion from the attorney
general in ORD-274 86 as to whether traffic summonses and complaints is-
sued by the police department must be made available to the public under
the Open Records Act. The attorney general ruled that disclosure could
not be compelled under the Act because, in Wichita Falls, the requested
records were kept by the judiciary, and the Open Records Act was not
applicable to the judiciary. 87 The attorney general noted, however, that
there was both a statutory88 and common law right of inspection of public
records applicable to the documents requested and, therefore, complaints
issued by the police department and filed with the clerk of the Municipal
Court should be made available to the public. 89
79. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-270 (1981).
80. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-271 (i981).
81. Id at 2.
82. TEX. Ar-r'y GEN. ORD-272 (1981).
83. Id
84. Id at 2.
85. Id
86. TEx. AT'rY GEN. ORD-274 (1981).
87. Id at 1.
88. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 1945 (Vernon 1964 & Pam. Supp. 1982) provides:
The clerk shall keep such other dockets, books and indexes as may be re-
quired by law; and all books, records and filed papers belonging to the office
of county clerks shall at all reasonable times be open to the inspection and
examination of any citizen, who shall have the right to make copies of the
same.
89. TEx. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-274, at 2 (1981).
1982]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL [o
In ORD-27590 the attorney general determined whether information re-
garding health maintenance organizations (HMO) filed with the State
Board of Insurance should be made available to the public. The attorney
general noted that article 20A.27 of the Texas Insurance Code specifically
made the information requested public and, thus, all information con-
tained in an application for certificate of authority to operate a health
maintenance organization and copies of federal HMO reports filed with
the State Board of Insurance constituted public information. 91
The Texas State Board of Dental Examiners conducted an investigation
in 1976 with regard to a licensee of the board concerning difficulties with
alcohol and drug abuse. In ORD-276,92 the attorney general held that
pursuant to article 4550, 93 the records and files of the Texas State Board of
Dental Examiners, including that investigation, were public records and
open to inspection at reasonable times.94 Article 4550 also provides that
investigation files are confidential until such time as the investigation is
complete or has been inactive for sixty days, at which time the files are
open to inspection. 95 The attorney general noted that the Open Records
Act specifically makes public any information currently regarded by
agency policy as open to the public, and therefore ordered that the infor-
mation be turned over to the requesting party.96
In ORD-277, the attorney general built upon prior decisions 97 holding
that qualifications of applicants for government jobs were public and not
exempt from disclosure under the Open Records Act. 98 ORD-277 in-
volved the qualifications of applicants for Commissioner of the Texas De-
partment of Human Resources. The attorney general ruled that such
qualifications must be released to the requesting party.99
In 1975 the attorney general issued ORD-68 holding that a letter of res-
ignation was excepted from disclosure under section 3(a)(2) of the Open
Records Act as "information in personnel files, the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ' ' °
ORD-68 was subsequently cited for the proposition that an employee's let-
ter of resignation was excepted per se, but ORD-278 drastically limited
that interpretation. The attorney general stated that "it is our opinion that
the decision should no longer be cited for the proposition that an em-
ployee's letter of resignation is excepted per se from public disclosure.
Disclosure of certain information contained in the particular letter of resig-
90. TEX. ATrrY GEN. ORD-275 (1981).
91. ld at 2. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.27 (Vernon 1963).
92. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-276 (1981).
93. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4550 (Vernon 1969).
94. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-276 (1981).
95. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4550, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
96. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-276 (1981).
97. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-257 (1980); Id ORD-264 (1981).
98. TEX. Arr'v GEN. ORD-277 (1981). See notes 42-46 and 66-68 supra and accompa-
nying text.
99. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-277 (1981).
100. TEX. A-r'Y GEN. ORD-68 (1975).
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nation might constitute a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy' but in the usual instance, we do not believe it will do so."101 The
attorney general ruled that two letters of resignation to the Odessa city
attorney should be turned over to the requesting party. 02
In ORD-279 the attorney general once again construed and upheld the
"informer's privilege."' 0 3 The decision upheld the Irving city attorney's
refusal to disclose the identity of a person who reported a zoning ordi-
nance violation.°4 The attorney general noted that although the privilege
was usually involved in the context of a criminal case, it also applied to
administrative officials having a duty of inspection or of law enforcement
within their particular spheres. 0 5 To insure free flow of information to the
government, the Open Records Act, has been construed by the attorney
general to exempt from disclosure the identity of individuals giving infor-
mation to an administrative or law enforcement agency.' 06
In ORD-28010 7 the plaintiff in a pending action against the Director of
the Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Laboratory sought information
relating to the funding, authoriiation, and publication of research and the
actual research for an article entitled "Antibody and Impro, a Commercial
Whey Antibody Blend." The attorney general ruled that the information
was excepted from disclosure because of the pending civil litigation and
because of the government attorney's reasonable determination that the
information should be withheld. 08
ORD-281109 involved a request for reports relating to the dismissal of a
former employee of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation. The dismissed employee filed a complaint with the Federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; therefore, the attorney gen-
eral ruled that the information sought was excluded under the litigation
exception to the Open Records Act. 0 The attorney representing the gov-
ernment employer and the assistant attorney general representing the gov-
ernment department both determined that the information should be
withheld from disclosure and the attorney general held that that determi-
nation was reasonable."' Similarly, in ORD-282 the attorney general also
applied the litigation exception." 2 Internal reports of the Texas Depart-
ment of Mental Health and Mental Retardation relating to inspection of
certain of its facilities were found to be exempted from disclosure in light
101. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-278 (1981).
102. Id
103. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-279 (1981).
104. Id at 2.
105. Id
106. Id
107. TEX. AT-r'y GEN. ORD-280 (1981).
108. Id at 2.
109. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-281 (1981).
110. Id
111. Id
112. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-282 (1981).
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of pending litigation. 13
Open Meetings Act. The 67th Legislature passed significant amendments
to the Open Meetings Act in H.B. No. 1555.114 Although the bill passed
113. ld
114. The proposed amendments to the Open Meetings Act read:
AN ACT
relating to notice requirements, violations, and the requirement to keep min-
utes under the open meetings law.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Chapter 271, Acts of the 60th Legislature, Regular Session,
1967, as amended (Article 6252-17, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), is amended
by amending Section 3 and by adding Section 3B to read as follows:
Section 3. (a) Any [interested] person, including bona fide members of the
news media, may commence an action either by mandamus or injunction for
the purpose of stopping, [or] preventing, or reversing violations or threatened
violations of this Act by members of a governing body. An action taken by a
governmental body in violation of this 4ct is voidable.
(b) .4 court may assess against a governmental body reasonable attorney's fees
and other costs oflitigation reasonably incurred in an action under this section in
which the plaintiff has substantially prevailed In exercising its discretion, the
court shall consider whether the governmental body's conduct had a reasonable
basis in law.
Sec. 3B. A governmental body shall prepare and retain minutes of each of its
meetings. The minutes shall state the subject matter of each deliberation and
shall indicate each vote, order, decision, or other action taken by the governmen-
tal body. The minutesprepared under this section arepublic records and shall be
made availableforpublic inspection and copying on request to the chief adminis-
trative officer of the governmental body.
SECTION 2. Subsections (a) and (h), Section 3A, Chapter 271, Acts of the
60th Legislature, Regular Session, 1967, as amended (Article 6252-17,
Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), are amended to read as follows:
(a) Written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held
by a governmental body shall be given before the 'meeting as prescribed by
this section [, and any action taken by a governmental body at a meeting on a
subject which was not stated on the agenda in the notice posted for such meet-
ing is voidable]. The requirement for notice prescribed by this section does
not apply to matters about which specific factual information or a recitation of
existing policy is furnished in response to an inquiry made at such meeting,
whether such inquiry is made by a member of the general public or by a mem-
ber of the governmental body. Any deliberation, discussion, or decision with
respect to the subject about which inquiry was made shall be limited to a
proposal to place such subject on the agenda for a subsequent meeting of such
governmental body for which notice has been provided in compliance with
this Act.
(h) Notice of a meeting must be posted in a place readily accessible to the
general public at all times for at least 72 hours preceding the scheduled time of
the meeting, except that notice of a meeting of a state board, commission,
department, or officer having statewide jurisdiction, other than the Industrial
Accident Board or the governing board of an institution of higher education,
must be posted by the Secretary of State for at least seven days preceding the
day of the meeting. In case of emergency or urgent public necessity, which
shall be clearly identiaed [expressed] in the notice, it shall be sufficient if the
notice is posted two hours before the meeting is convened. Cases of emergency
and urgent public necessity are limited to imminent threats to ublic health and
safety and unforeseeable situations requiring immediate action by the governmen-
tal body. Provided further, that where a meeting has been called with notice
thereof posted in accordance with this subsection, additional subjects may be
added to the agenda for such meeting by posting a supplemental notice, in
[Vol. 36
LOCAL GO VERNMENT LAW
the house and senate, the measure was vetoed by Governor Clements on
June 18, 1981.' '5 Notwithstanding the vetoed legislation, the 67th Legisla-
ture did pass some amendments to the Open Meetings Act. Subsection
3(A)(e) was amended to read:
A school district shall have a notice posted on a bulletin board located
at a place convenient to the public in its central administrative office
and shall give notice by telephone or telegraph to any news media
requesting such notice and consenting to pay any and all expenses
incurred by the school district in providing special notice."
6
The legislature also amended article 12691 7 by adding section 13a that
provides that a housing authority may not authorize the construction of a
project unless a public meeting about the proposed project is held before
the construction site is approved." 8 The meeting is to be held as close as
possible to the proposed site." 19 A majority of the housing commissioners
which the emergency or urgent public necessity requiring consideration of
such additional subjects is expressed. In the event of an emergency meeting,
or in the event any subject is added to the agenda in a supplemental notice
posted for a meeting other than an emergency meeting, it shall be sufficient if
the notice or supplemental notice is posted two hours before the meeting is
convened, and the presiding officer or the member calling such emergency
meeting or posting supplemental notice to the agenda for any other meeting
shall, if request therefor containing all pertinent information has previously
been filed at the headquarters of the governmental body, give notice by tele-
phone or telegraph to any news media requesting such notice and consenting
to pay any and all expenses incurred by the governmental body in providing
such special notice. The notice provisions for legislative committee meetings
shall be as provided by the rules of the house and senate.
SECTION 3. The importance of this legislation and the crowded condition
of the calendars in both houses create an emergency and an imperative public
necessity that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three several
days in each house be suspended, and this rule is hereby suspended, and that
this Act take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so
enacted.
President of the Senate Speaker of the House
I certify that H.B. No. 1555 was passed by the House on May 30, 1981, by a
non-record vote.
Chief Clerk of the House
I certify that H.B. No. 1555 was passed by the Senate on May 31, 1981, by
the following vote: Yeas 30, Nays 0.




H.B. 1555, 67th Leg. (1981).
115. Texas Legislative Service Final Report, 67th Legis., Regular Session, Jan. 13-June
1, 1981, at 62.
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
117. TEX REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269 (Vernon 1963).
118. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k, § 13a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
119. Id § 13a(a).
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must attend the meeting, and any person who owns or leases real property
within a one-fourth mile radius of the site of the proposed project must be
given the opportunity to comment on the proposal. 120 In addition, the
housing commissioners must post notice of the date, hour, place, and sub-
ject of the meeting at least thirty days before the scheduled day of the
meeting at the county courthouse of the county in which the proposed pro-
ject is to be located, and at the city hall if the proposed project is to be
located within the boundaries of an incorporated city.' 2 1 A copy of the
notice must be published in a newspaper or newspapers that provide gen-
eral circulation to the county in which the proposed project is to be lo-
cated.' 22 Actual notice must be mailed to any person who owns real
property within one-fourth of a mile radius of the site of the proposed
project.' 23 At the site of the proposed project a sign must be posted having
dimensions no smaller than four feet by four feet, which states "Site of
Proposed Housing Project."' 24 If the notice provisions are not complied
with, the Act prohibits an incorporated city or town or other political sub-
division from issuing a permit, certificate, or other authorization for the
construction or occupancy of a housing project under the Act. 125
During the 1981-1982 interim of the 67th Legislature, the Speaker of the
House directed the Judiciary Committee to make an interim study of the
Open Meetings Act. The committee, consisting of Representatives Adkis-
son, Bush, Coleman, and Rangel, met during 1982 to consider revisions to
the Open Meetings Act.
Although several judicial interpretations of the Open Meetings Act were
made during the survey period, the Texas Supreme Court had only one
occasion to deal with the Act. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Conti-
nental Bus System, Inc. 126 the court was presented with an odd situation.
On April 25, 1975, the Railroad Commission issued an order pursuant to
proceedings that concededly did not comply with the notice requirements
of the Open Meetings Act. An appeal was taken from that order. On
August 6, 1975, after notice and compliance with the Open Meetings Act,
the Railroad Commission issued another order granting the same relief
although an additional party was added. The supreme court reiterated the
rule that the Railroad Commission may not change an order after it loses
jurisdiction by appeal.127 The court found, however, that the rule did not
apply if the commission had not yet acted upon the application from
which the appeal was taken. 28 Concluding that the notice on the August
6, 1975 order was sufficient, that the commission had jurisdiction to enter
the August 6, 1975 order, and finally, that the order was supported by sub-
120. Id




125. Id § 13a(c).
126. 616 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1981).




stantial evidence, the supreme court affirmed the commission's order. 129
The interpretation of the Open Meetings Act was also the subject of
several decisions of other Texas courts. Porth v. Morgan 130 involved the
issue of whether a municipal body could ratify an action taken in violation
of the Open Meetings Act. At a meeting closed to the public, in violation
of article 6252-17, the Texas Open Meetings Act, the Houston County
Hospital Authority Board elected a director. On February 1, 1980, the
board conducted an open meeting wherein the individual was elected as
vice chairman of the board. The court held that the initial action was in-
valid, and therefore could not be ratified by the later meeting.' 3'
Coates v. Windham 132 involved an effort by property owners and tax-
payers to permanently enjoin directors of the Department of Corrections
from erecting a state prison in Grimes County, Texas. One of the plain-
tiffs' contentions was that action by the government was taken in violation
of the Open Meetings Act. The attack involved the adequacy of notice of
the meeting, and the failure of the presiding officer at that meeting to iden-
tify the statutory section authorizing a closed meeting. The appellees con-
tended that local notoriety or general newspaper publicity of the
proceedings was sufficient to supply the notice required by the Act. The
court squarely held that such newspaper publicity was not adequate notice
under the Act. 133 Nevertheless, the court found that the notice that had
stated only that the board would consider a report of the site selection
committee, substantially complied with the notice provisions of section 3A
of article 6252-17 of the Act. ' 34 The court noted, however, that the words
"skirt the very edge of sufficiency."' 135 With respect to the presiding of-
ficer's failure to identify why the meeting was being closed, the court held
that the board violated section 2(a) of the statute, but that the enforcement
provision of section 3A, making actions voidable, could not apply. 136 The
court stated that the enforcement provision only applied to a public body's
failure to give sufficient notice of an intended meeting and did not apply to
the failure of a presiding officer to identify the section that authorized a
closed meeting. 137 Inexplicably, the court stated that it did not need to
decide whether any of the other enforcement provisions of the Texas Open
Meetings Act would be applicable to this omission. 38
In Rogers v. State Board of Optometry,139 the court was asked to decide
whether the Open Meetings Act required a governmental body to list, as
129. Id at 183-84.
130. 622 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. Id at 475-76.
132. 613 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
133. Id. at 577.
134. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A (Vernon Supp. 1982) requires that





139. 619 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
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an agenda item, an executive session that is called for the purpose of seek-
ing an attorney's advice with respect to pending litigation. The court held
that the written notice requirements of section 3A of article 6252-17, did
not apply to such an executive session. 140 The court also found no other
requirement in the Texas Open Meetings Act that required the listing of
such a session as an agenda item on the notice posted for an open
meeting.' 4 1
In Cameron County Good Government League v. Ramon' 4 2 one of the
issues was whether the Cameron County Commissioners' Court was sys-
tematically violating the Open Meetings Act by improperly calling emer-
gency meetings when there was in fact no emergency. The trial court
granted judgment for the defendants at the close of plaintiffs' case. On the
appellate level, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs had no standing
to enforce the Open Meetings Act and that the question of "emergency" or
"urgent public necessity" was not a proper subject of judicial review. The
Beaumont court found that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the
Act. 143 The court noted that "[i]t is difficult to see how the Legislature
could broaden the class of 'any interested person' " entitled to enforce the
Act.'" The court also rejected the contention that a governing body has
"unbridled power to decide what is an emergency under the Open Meet-
ings Act."' 45 Such a holding, the court said, would emasculate the mean-
ing of the Act.
Cameras in the Courtroom. As noted in the last survey of Local Govern-
ment Law, 146 the United States Supreme Court decided in Chandler v.
Florida 147 that televising criminal judicial proceedings did not per se vio-
late the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.1 48 Following this
decision, the Texas State Bar formed a "State Bar Committee on Cameras
in the Courtroom." The committee proposed an amendment to canon
3A(7) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, 49 which provided:
A judge may authorize broadcasting, recording, or photographing in
the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions
140. Id at 606.
141. Id
142. 619 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
143. Id at 230.
144. Id
145. Id at 231.
146. Babcock & Collins, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw.
L.J. 409, 421-22 (1981).
147. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
148. Id at 582-83. Following this decision a number of states considered the possibility
of televising judicial proceedings. See Beisman, In the Wake of Florida. A Comprehensive
Approach to the Implementation of Cameras in the Courtroom, 33 F. COMM. L.J. 117 (1981);
Day, The Case Against Cameras in the Courtroom, 20 JUDGES' J. 18 (1981); Nevas, The Case
for Cameras in the Courtroom, 20 JUDGES' J. 22 (1981); Pequignot, From Estes to Chandler.-
Shifting the Constitutional Burden of Courtroom Cameras to the States, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
315 (1981).
149. State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon No. 3A(7)(d), TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 app. (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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of the court, recesses between sessions, and on other occasions, pro-
vided that:
(a) The participants will not be distracted nor will the dignity of the
proceedings be impaired;
(b) The broadcasting, recording or photographing of any court pro-
ceedings will be in compliance with guidelines adopted by the
Supreme Court of Texas.150
In addition to the amendment, the committee also proposed guidelines and
a rule regarding extended media coverage of judicial proceedings.15'
The committee formally presented the proposals to the Texas Supreme
Court,' 52 and the court then presented the guidelines and related informa-
tion to the annual Judicial Section Conference in Corpus Christi in Sep-
tember, 1981.1 53
Following presentations, the judiciary was polled and the proposal was
defeated 182 to 36.154 The Texas Supreme Court then, by unanimous vote,
turned down the plan to allow cameras in the courtroom. 55 Chief Justice
Joe Greenhill indicated that the court would not reconsider the matter any
time in the near future.15 6
Legislative Developments. The Texas Legislature passed several laws re-
garding government information. Six statutes made certain government
records confidential,157 while other new laws made information specifi-
150. Driver, Cameras in the Courtroom.- Committee Reviews Proposed Guidelines, 44 TEX.
B.J. 393, 394 (April 1981).
151. Id. at 394-97.
152. The Texas Associated Press Broadcasters requested the Texas Supreme Court to
amend its rules in 1981. See Supreme Court of Texas Says "No" to Courtroom Cameras,
Special Message from State Bar President Wayne Fisher (Oct. 1981) (copy on file at offices
of Southwestern Law Journal).
153. The conference included 'presentations by the National Association of Broadcasters
and by the Chief Justices of the Alabama and Florida Supreme Courts, courts that allow
photographic coverage. Austin attorney Roy Minton, who represented Representative Billy




157. The following information was made confidential by the Legislature: TEX. TAX.
CODE ANN. § 11 1.006(a)(2) (Vernon Pam. 1981) now makes confidential:
all information secured, derived or obtained by the comptroller or the attorney
general during the course of an examination of the taxpayer's books, records,
papers, officers, or employees, including an examination of the business af-
fairs, operations, sources of income, profits, losses, or expenditures of the
taxpayer.
In addition, the Act provides that "[a]l information made confidential in this title may not
be subject to subpoena directed to the comptroller or attorney general except in a judicial or
administrative proceeding in which this state, another state, or the federal government is a
party." Id § 111.006(c). TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 419a (Vernon Supp. 1982), con-
cerning the identification of persons operating railroad locomotives, was amended to pro-
vide that:If a person operating a railroad locomotive is involved in an accident with
another train or a motor vehicle or is arrested for violation of a law relating to
the person's operation of a locomotive, the number or other identifying infor-
mation about the person's, operator's, commercial operator's, or chauffer's





One case during the survey period considered incorporation issues. In
State v. Town of Hudson Oaks 159 the State, acting through the Parker
County District Attorney on relation of the City of Weatherford, brought a
quo warranto proceeding to declare the incorporation of the town of Hud-
son Oaks invalid. The trial court rendered a summary judgment uphold-
and the person's involvement in the accident or violation may not be recorded
in the person's individual driving record maintained by the Department of
Public Safety.
Article 5547-202 was amended by adding a new section 2.27 which provides:
For the purpose of confidentiality of client records, the facilities of the depart-
ment and all community centers for mental health and mental retardation
services created purusuant to Article 3 of the Texas Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act, as amended (Article 5547-203, Vernon's Texas Civil Stat-
utes), will be considered as component parts of one service delivery system
within which client records may be exchanged without the consent of the
client.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-202, § 2.27 (Vernon Supp. 1982). The Legislature
also passed an act relating to the confidentiality of information and records relating to
known or suspected cases of sexually transmissible diseases by amending article 4445, § 8.
The amendment provides:
All information and records held by the Texas Department of Health and its
agents relating to known or suspected cases of sexually transmissible diseases
shall be strictly confidential. Such information shall not be released or made
public upon subpoena or otherwise, except that release may be made under
the following circumstances (involving medical or epidemiological informa-
tion) ....
Id (Vernon Supp. 1982).
The Legislature made confidential information specifying the location of any site or item
declared to be a state archeological landmark by amending TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 191.004 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
Finally, the legislature passed an act relating to the purchase, care, and disposition of
certain items made of crafted precious metal. TEX. RaEv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 9009a
(Vernon Supp. 1982) provides for a dealer engaging in the business of purchasing and sell-
ing crafted precious metals to maintain certain records and keep them open for inspection
by police officers during regular business hours. In addition, the Act provides that "infor-
mation obtained under this Section is confidential except for use in a criminal investigation
or prosecution or a civil court proceeding." Id
158. The legislature passed an act relating to the creation and funding of a child support
collection office under the Juvenile Board of Smith County. The act amended article 5139E-
1, § 2, and provides that
the child support office shall keep an accurate and complete record of its re-
ceipts and disbursements of support payment funds. The record is open to
inspection by the public. It is the duty of the County Auditor or other duly
authorized person in the county to inspect and examine the records and audit
the accounts quarterly and to report his findings and recommendations to the
judges.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5139E-1, § 2 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1982).
Finally, an act was passed by the 67th Legislature relating to the record identifying per-
sons who request access to certain financial information filed with the secretary of state by
state officers and employees. Financial statements and affidavits fied under TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b (Vernon Supp. 1982) are public records. Id § 9(a). Anyone re-
questing to see these public records, however, is required to state his name, address, whom
the person represents, and the date of the request. This information is also public. Id
159. 610 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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ing the validity of the incorporation, but on appeal the Eastland Court of
Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. 160 Hudson Oaks' position was that
the summary judgment was properly granted because the quo warranto
proceeding was not brought within thirty days after the return date of the
election, as allegedly required by articles 9.03 and 9.30 of the Texas Elec-
tion Code. 161 The court of civil appeals, however, determined that the
statutory thirty-day notice provision applicable to election contests did not
apply because the State's quo warranto proceeding was not an "election
contest."' 162 The court defined election contests as involving challenges to
the election process itself, and said that in the case at bar the State did not
challenge the election process but only sought to determine whether Hud-
son Oaks had proper authority to seek incorporation.
63
III. POLICE POWER
Three cases of interest discussing the police power of local governments
were decided during the survey period. In Comeau v. City of Brookside
Village164 plaintiffs, owners of a four acre lot in the city of Brookside Vil-
lage, challenged two city ordinances that prohibited them from moving a
mobile home onto their property. The ordinances allowed parking of mo-
bile homes in Brookside Village only in mobile home parks. The court of
civil appeals reversed the trial judge and rendered judgment that the ordi-
nances were invalid.165 The court stated that the police power could re-
strict a citizen's right to use his property as he chose only if such use
"threatens the public health, the public safety, the public comfort or wel-
fare." 66 Stating that Brookside Village had not substantiated its conten-
tion that the ordinances were justified by public health considerations, the
court found the challenged ordinances an unreasonable exercise of the po-
lice power. 167
A challenge to the City of Burkburnett's power to regulate the drilling
and operation of oil wells within its city limits met a different fate in Helton
v. City of Burkburnett.168 Helton refused to obtain a permit to drill an oil
160. Id at 550.
161. Id at 550-51 n.2. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. arts. 9.03, 9.30 (Vernon 1967).
162. 610 S.W.2d at 550. The court was not swayed by the contrary language in State v.
City of Azle, 588 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ) ("In the instant
case even if State had raised the matter of population as an issue for trial it would come too
late-for there was no contest of validity of the election within thirty (30) days after the
return date of the Azle election. We hold the provision as to time to be mandatory and
jurisdictional.").
163. 610 S.W.2d at 551.
164. 616 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1981, writ granted).
165. Id at 335.
166. Id at 334 (citing Spann v. City of Dallas, Ill Tex. 350, 357, 235 S.W. 513, 515
(1921)).
167. 616 S.W.2d at 334-35. The interest proposed by the city was a danger to public
health caused by too many septic tanks. The evidence showed, however, that if the plaintiffs
had built an ofn-site house, which was allowed, the same septic system would have been
necessary as with a mobile home. Thus, the court found no justification for the distinction
the ordinances drew between mobile and stationary homes. Id
168. 619 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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well on a lease he owned, as'required by ordinance no. 375 of the City of
Burkburnett. Ordinance no. 375 regulated oil well drilling in several re-
spects, and authorized the City Commissioners to refuse a permit to drill a
well when drilling might be injurious to the city or its citizens. Burkbur-
nett obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting Helton from drilling un-
til he obtained a permit. Helton appealed this ruling to the Fort Worth
Court of Civil Appeals, asserting that ordinance no. 375 violated his due
process and equal protection constitutional rights. Primarily, Helton ar-
gued that the ordinance went beyond the legitimate use of the city's police
power by allowing a total prohibition of drilling. The court disagreed, and
held that the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of Burkburnett's police
power.169 The court stated that an ordinance passed pursuant to the city's
police power carried a presumption of validity, and that "[flor a challenge
to be successful the ordinance must clearly appear to be unreasonable and
arbitrary."' 70 The court ruled that ordinance no. 375 did not violate due
process, but rather "merely provides rules facilitating the orderly and har-
monious development of both oil exploration and city growth."' 7'
In Sign Supplies, Inc. v. McConn 172 various individuals and businesses
engaged in renting, leasing, and manufacturing portable signs challenged
three ordinances of the City of Houston regulating the size, height, loca-
tion, and construction of signs and billboards within Houston's city limits.
The ordinances, among other things, restricted the future use of portable
signs on an off-premise locations. The plaintiffs contended that the ordi-
nances (1) amounted to a taking of property without just compensation
and without due process of law; (2) were unconstitutionally vague; (3) in-
fringed their right to engage in a legitimate business; (4) constituted a prior
restraint on freedom of speech; (5) impaired contract rights; (6) denied
equal protection; and (7) conflicted with state and federal law. Houston
defended the ordinances as a legitimate exercise of its police power and the
district court agreed.173 First, the court noted that Houston was specifi-
cally authorized by statute to regulate signs and billboards, 74 and that the
regulation of outdoor advertising was "a reasonable and proper exercise of
the police power."' 75 Further, the court found that the ordinances set
forth a reasonable, comprehensive scheme for regulating outdoor advertis-
ing and that its provisions bore a substantial relationship to the public
health, safety, and general welfare.176
169. Id at 24.
170. Id. (citing Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927)).
171. Id. The court also rejected Helton's equal protection challenge. Id at 24-25.
172. 517 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1981).
173. 517 F. Supp. at 780.
174. Id at 781-82 (citing TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1175(24) (Vernon 1963)).
175. Id at 782.
176. Id The court found that (1) the ordinances, though perhaps reducing the value of
plaintiffs' businesses, did not totally prohibit the use of portable signs and did not constitute
a "taking" of plaintiffs' property, and that the ordinances would be upheld even if a "taking"
were found, because the ordinances were shown to bear a real relation to the public interest;
(2) the ordinances were not unconstitutionally vague; (3) the equal protection clause was not
violated by the differing treatment of on-premise and off-premise advertising because Hous-
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IV. MISCELLANEOUS CHALLENGES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION
The courts considered many challenges to local government action dur-
ing the survey period that are not easily categorized. Some of the more
interesting are discussed herein.
17 7
The Texas Supreme Court considered free speech issues in Iranian Mus-
lim Organization v. City of San Antonio .178 In December 1979, members of
the Iranian Muslim Organization applied to the City of San Antonio for
parade permits for two downtown demonstrations against the presence at a
nearby air force base of the former Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi. The Ku
Klux Klan then filed an application to demonstrate at the same time and
place. On December 4, the city manager denied the applications. The
Iranians then filed suit to enjoin San Antonio from interfering with their
rights of free speech and assembly, and to require San Antonio to grant
their parade permit. The district court denied a temporary restraining or-
der. On December 5, Iranians on a hunger strike at the San Antonio City
Hall were taken into protective custody when threatened by an angry
crowd. The San Antonio City Council, on December 11, upheld the city
manager's denial of the Iranians' application for a permit and also banned
parades or demonstrations by others "pro or con in the Iranian ques-
ton had a rational basis for the distinctions it made; (4) plaintiffs' right to pursue their busi-
nesses was not violated by the ordinances because the ordinances were rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose; (5) the restraint upon contracts between sign owners and
landowners occasioned by the ordinances did not amount to a constitutional impairment of
contract because the ordinances were in furtherance of the general welfare; (6) the ordi-
nances reasonably regulated the manner of advertising and did not infringe unduly upon
free speech values; and (7) the ordinances did not conflict with the federal or state highway
beautification acts. Id at 782-86.
177. For other interesting cases, see Stone v. City of Wichita Falls, 646 F.2d 1085 (5th
Cir. 1981) (Wichita Falls City Charter provision providing that any appointed officer of
Wichita Falls who becomes a candidate for elected office shall forfeit his position with the
city was void because it was inconsistent with TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 22
(Vernon Supp. 1982), which imposes certain restrictions on political activities of fire and
police officers but does not prohibit fireman's attempt to seek elective office); Reeves v. Mc-
Conn, 631 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1980) (Houston ordinance regulating sound amplification
equipment unconstitutional in several respects because unduly restrictive as to time, place
and manner of use, and unduly vague as to prohibited language); City of Waco v. Roddey,
613 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ dism'd) (awarding damages resulting
from partial demolition by Waco of vacant house owned by plaintiff; lack of due process
existed even though Waco complied with the notice provisions of its ordinance by giving
publication notice because plaintiff had no actual notice and plaintiff was known and could
easily have been notified); Moncrief v. Gurley, 609 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (office of county treasurer found to be a constitutional office
that could not be abolished without constitutional authorization; because no such authoriza-
tion found, the legislature acted unconstitutionally when it authorized an election to abolish
the office of County Treasurer of Tarrant County); City of Houston v. Glenshannon
Townhouse Community Ass'n, Inc., 607 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.],
no writ) (equal protection clause violated by allowing other townhouse associations to par-
ticipate in a garbage costs reimbursement program but rejecting plaintiff's application to
participate; as a result Houston was responsible for the association's damages pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); City of Wichita Falls v. Streetman, 607 S.W.2d 644
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ) (declaring void a city ordinance regulating loca-
tion of mobile homes because there was no published notice of the ordinance prior to or
after its passage, in violation of statutory and city charter requirements).
178. 615 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1981).
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tion."' 79 On December 17, the trial court denied a temporary injunction,
which was affirmed on appeal. 180 In a 5-4 decision, the supreme court
reversed, finding that San Antonio had not met its " 'heavy burden' to jus-
tify the imposition of a prior restraint on the exercise of free speech."''
The court stressed San Antonio's failure to make any effort to resolve the
perceived problem of violence directed at the Iranian demonstrations by
regulation of the demonstrations' time, place, and manner. 8 2
The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in Banknote Club v. City of Dallas 83
considered the extent to which municipalities can regulate establishments
selling alcoholic beverages under permits granted by the Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Commission. The Banknote Club, which allowed dancing, and
Stan's Boilermaker, which provided live entertainment, held such permits.
The City of Dallas asserted the right to regulate the two businesses, and to
assess fees against them, pursuant to ordinances governing dance halls and
theaters. The two clubs argued that under article XI, section 5 of the
Texas Constitution, 84 Dallas could not by ordinance act inconsistently
with the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code, and that the Code preempted the
field of regulation of Alcoholic Beverage Commission permittees. The
court disagreed, finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code proscribed local
governments from regulating the occupation of dispensing legal beverages,
and from setting up conditions for engaging in that occupation, but did not
prohibit local governments from enforcing regulations or collecting fees in
connection with the performance of other occupations in which a person
with an Alcoholic Beverage Commission permit might wish to engage si-
multaneously.' 85 The court found that the Dallas ordinances regulating
dance halls and theaters were not inconsistent with the Code, and affirmed
the trial court's judgment for Dallas.' 8 6
Two federal court decisions dealt with attempts by Texas cities to regu-
late adult theaters. In Spiegel v. City ofHouston 187 owners of a substantial
portion of the adult movie theaters in the City of Houston filed suit against
Houston, the Houston Police Department, the Harris County District At-
torney, and individuals working for these entities, alleging a conspiracy to
drive the theaters out of business. The district court granted a preliminary
injunction forbidding the Houston Police Department from forcing pa-
trons of adult theaters to give their names and addresses and from arrest-
ing theater employees when the arrest would tend to close the theater. 88
179. Id at 205.
180. 604 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980).
181. 615 S.W.2d at 208.
182. Id at 207.
183. 608 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.)
184. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5 provides that "no charter or any ordinance passed under
said charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with ... the general laws enacted by
the Legislature."
185. 608 S.W.2d at 718.
186. Id at 718-19.
187. 636 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981).
188. Id at 998.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the granting of the injunction, but
remanded the case to the district court to narrow the scope of the injunc-
tion.189 The court determined that the district court had not abused its
discretion in finding: (1) that the theater owners would probably prevail
on the merits of their claim that the police had no legitimate explanation
for their activities and in fact were simply harassing the theaters; (2) that
there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable harm in the permanent
loss of theater customers; and (3) that the public interest was not damaged
by the injunction when the taking of names was not shown to be of any use
and the employees' arrests occurred prior to a determination that the mo-
tion pictures being shown were obscene. 190 The circuit court made clear,
however, that enjoining good faith efforts to obtain witnesses in an investi-
gation or for trial, or enjoining arrests where significant law enforcement
efforts were involved was not be proper,' 9 ' and remanded to the district
court for correction of the injunction. 92
Galveston's efforts to use zoning to restrict the location of adult theaters
was considered in Basiardanes v. City of Galveston. 93 The plaintiff owned
a building in Galveston that he began to convert into an adult movie thea-
ter. The Galveston City Council then enacted an ordinance amending the
Galveston zoning ordinance to restrict the operation of adult theaters to
areas which did not include the location of plaintiff's property. The plain-
tiff brought suit, alleging that the definition of adult theater in the ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally vague, and that the prohibited area was
unreasonably restrictive and in effect a suppression of free speech. The
court determined that the ordinance's definition of "adult motion picture
theater," though perhaps imprecise, relied upon United States Supreme
Court cases attempting to define obscenity and was not unconstitutionally
vague.' 94 More interestingly, the court construed Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc. ,195 the seminal United States Supreme Court decision al-
lowing restrictive zoning of adult theaters in certain circumstances. 196 The
plaintiff argued that only fifteen to twenty per cent of Galveston's land
area could be used for adult theaters under the ordinance, and that these
areas were not commercially viable. The court, however, construed Mini
Theatres as not guaranteeing that adult theaters would be "selectively ex-
empt from the reasonable economic burden that befalls some activity in
every land use program."' 97 The court added that "the ordinance strikes
at the pocket book not at the Constitution" if the ordinance leaves an am-
ple area for exhibition of adult movies even though the area is not com-
189. Id at 1003.
190. Id at 1001-02.
191. Id. at 1002-03.
192. Id at 1003.
193. 514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
194. Id at 979-81.
195. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
196. See 514 F. Supp. at 981-82.
197. Id at 982.
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pletely advantageous.1 98 In light of these principles, the court held that the
Galveston ordinance did not so impact upon free speech as to be violative
of the Constitution.199
In Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of AMesquite 200 the Fifth Circuit over-
turned a Mesquite ordinance aimed at a coin operated amusement center
to be operated by Aladdin's Castle, Inc. After first encouraging Aladdin's
to locate in Mesquite, the city began a determined effort to keep Aladdin's
out of the city, apparently believing that Aladdin's had ties to the mafia.
As the case reached the circuit court, Aladdin's was challenging a Mes-
quite ordinance that prohibited the issuance of licenses for coin operated
amusement centers to anyone having a "connection with criminal ele-
ments," and that prohibited children under the age of seventeen from play-
ing coin operated games. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the ordinance's "connection with criminal elements" language was
unconstitutionally vague and therefore void,20' and also found that the age
prohibition had no rational basis and unconstitutionally infringed on the
rights of minors to freely associate. 20 2
V. TORT LIABILITY
The current survey period again contained many examples of the strug-
gle between plaintiffs asserting claims for damages resulting from govern-
mental action and governments seeking shelter within the protective walls
of governmental immunity.203 This section discusses decisions considering
notice requirements for claims made against municipalities resulting from
their performance of "proprietary" functions, 204 decisions considering the
Texas Tort Claims Act,20 5 and recent federal cases interpreting the federal
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Municpality Notice Requirements. Claimants suing municipalities for
"proprietary" torts have often found their claims foreclosed by failure to
comply strictly with the notice requirements found in many city char-
ters.2°6 The Texas Supreme Court, however, recently delivered an impor-
tant decision that somewhat ameliorates the harshness of the notice rules.
InArtco-Bell Corp. v. City of Temple207 Artco-Bell sued the city of Temple
198. Id
199. Id at 982-83.
200. 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980),prob. uriv. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2312, 68 L. Ed. 2d 838
(1981).
201. 630 F.2d at 1037-38.
202. Id at 1038-44.
203. For an outline of the scope of Texas governmental immunity, see Babcock & Col-
lins, supra note 1, at 452.
204. Municipalities have long been responsible for torts committed in the performance of
"proprietary" as opposed to "governmental" functions. Id at 453.
205. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1982).
206. See, e.g., LaBove v. City of Groves, 602 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont),
writ re/dnre per curlim, 608 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1980); Bowling v. City of Port Arthur, 522
S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ refd n.r.e.)
207. 616 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1981).
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for damages to its truck caused by the truck's collision with a tree limb
overhanging a city street. The issue for the supreme court was whether the
Austin Court of Civil Appeals had properly sustained the trial court's sum-
mary judgment for Temple on the basis of Artco-Bell's failure to send a
verfied notice of its claim to the city as required in the Temple City Char-
ter. The supreme court noted that as a home rule city, Temple's power to
enact the notice provision derived from article 1175, paragraph 6, which
provides that a home rule city, among its other powers, may "provide for
the exemption from liability on account of any claim for any damages to
any person or property, or. . . fix such rules and regulations governing the
city's liability as may be deemed advisable. ' 208 The court did not quarrel
with the proposition that notice requirements serve useful purposes,2°9 and
noted that under the Texas Constitution home rule cities have full powers
of self government, except when the legislature places limitations on those
powers.210 The court held, however, that the legislature in article 1175 had
restricted a home rule city to enacting only reasonable rules and regula-
tions governing the city's liability; the court found this limitation in the "as
may be deemed advisable" language of paragraph 6.211
Applying this reasonableness test, the supreme court found Temple's
verification requirement unreasonable and declared it invalid. 212 Chastis-
ing Temple for delaying its rejection of Artco-Bell's claim until after the
time for giving notice had passed, and noting that in other cases cities had
conducted themselves similarly, the supreme court stated that "the verifi-
cation requirement placed in home-rule city charters. . . is unreasonable
in that, rather than to aid in the administration of justice by preventing
spurious and unfounded claims, the verification notice in fact places an
obstacle in the path of citizens pursuing a legitimate redress for wrongs
committed by public entities.' ' 213  The court distinguished lower court
cases precluding actions against municipalities because of claimants' fail-
ure to comply with verified notice requirements, saying that in those cases
the question of whether the verification requirement without an amend-
ment procedure represented an unreasonable extension of the powers al-
lowed in article 1175, paragraph 6, was not presented.214
208. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, para. 6 (Vernon 1963).
209. 616 S.W.2d at 192.
210. Id at 193.
211. Id
212. Id at 193-94. The court reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals and
remanded the cause for trial on the merits. Id at 194.
213. Id at 193. Although the court criticizes Temple severely, worse behavior could be
imagined. Upon receiving Artco-Bell's unverified notice shortly after the accident, the Tem-
ple city attorney wrote Artco-Bell stating that upon receipt of a proper notice Artco-Bell's
claim would be processed. The city attorney enclosed with this letter a copy of the provision
of the Temple City Charter which required a verified notice. Artco-Bell then, on the last day
for filing notice, by its attorney mailed a second unverified claim. Id at 191; see also fact
discussion in court of civil appeals decision, 603 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980).
Artco-Bell, a corporation represented by counsel and supplied with the charter requirements
by the city, was not the unwary citizen the supreme court depicted as the victim of clever
municipal lawyers.
214. 616 S.W.2d at 194.
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Two Texas Supreme Court decisions rendered after Artco-Bell indicate
that all city charter verification requirements (without amendment proce-
dures) applicable to proprietary tort claims are invalid, but that the
supreme court will strictly apply other notice requirements that it considers
reasonable. In Walker v. City of Houston21 5 Walker sued the City of
Houston for damages sustained when Walker's automobile ran into a hole
dug in a city street by the city water department. Houston's defense was
that Walker's written notice of her claim was unverified. The supreme
court said that in Artco-Bell "we held that the requirement of verification
of the notice of claim against a city represents an unreasonable limitation
on a city's liability and is invalid as it is contrary to the limitation of au-
thority placed upon home rule cities by Article 1175, Para. 6. '"216 Without
further discussion, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment for
Walker.217
In City of Houston v. Torres,218 however, the supreme court refused to
increase the number of escape routes from city charter notice provisions.
Torres, a mailman, stepped into a water meter hole covered with grass and
weeds while on his route in May, 1974. Torres felt a sharp pain in his back
and leg at the time of the accident, and upon completing his route filled
out a federal form stating that he had been injured. Torres also saw his
family doctor, but continued to work and was not particularly concerned
about his back pain. In August of 1974, the pain increased, and in Octo-
ber, 1974, Torres required surgery. The first notice Houston had of the
injury was when Torres submitted a verified claim on October 29, 1974.219
This notice was submitted 171 days after Torres' injury; the Houston City
Charter required written notice to be given within ninety days after the
injury. Torres argued that he was excused from giving the 90 day notice
because he believed the injury was trivial. The supreme court disagreed.
The court found no "good cause" provision in the city charter, and no
"good cause" exception in case law.220 Further, the court said that to rec-
215. 617 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1981).
216. Id at 674.
217. Id
218. 621 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. 1981).
219. Id at 590. In an interesting aside, the court notes that because there was no evi-
dence or contention that Houston had actual notice of Torres' injury, "it is unnecessary to
determine if the actual notice exception of section 16 [of the Texas Tort Claims Act] applies
to a proprietary tort." Id The actual notice exception of section 16 is probably not directly
applicable in proprietary situations. See Hughes, "Notice of Claim" as a Condition Precedent
to Suit.- Is the Proprietary-Governmental Distinction Important?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 438
(1979). Ironically, before the Tort Claims Act was passed claimants could recover from
municipalities only for proprietary torts. Recovery for such torts may now be harder than
recovery for governmental torts -covered by the Act due to section 16's actual notice
exception. The supreme court, however, may-be willing to address the issue of actual notice
in proprietary situations; by extension from Artco-Bell it may be "unreasonable" to require a
written notice when the city has available all necessary information and may investigate
further if it desires.
220. Id at 591. The court did recognize two exceptions to the requirement of timely
notice: (1) when a city is estopped from asserting noncompliance, and (2) when a person is




ognize a good cause exception would undermine the purpose of the notice
requirement: "to ensure a prompt reporting of claims to enable the munic-
ipality to investigate while facts are fresh and conditions remain substan-
tially the same. '221 The court concluded that Torres knew of his injury, as
evidenced by his filing a notice of injury form with his employer and see-
ing his doctor, and was not excused from complying with the mandatory
notice provision of the city charter.222 Reversing the judgment of the
lower courts, the court rendered judgment that Torres take nothing.223
Texas Tort Claims Act. The Texas Supreme Court construed the Texas
Tort Claims Act224 in one case during the survey period. In Duhart v.
State225 the widow and children of Duhart, a deceased employee of the
Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, sued the state
for exemplary damages due to Duhart's death while performing bridge
maintenance duties. The supreme court stated the rule of Texas law that
the state is immune from suit unless the legislature has consented to suit,226
and noted that the Tort Claims Act provides specifically, in section 3,227
that the Act's waiver of immunity "DOES NOT extend to punitive or ex-
emplary damages. ' 228 The petitioners argued that the legislature created a
cause of action allowing exemplary damages when it provided for worker's
compensation insurance for employees of the State Highway Department.
The court rejected this argument, however, relying in part on the express
provision in section 3 against exemplary damages, and affirmed the judg-
ments of the lower courts dismissing the suit.229
Duhart was applied by the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals in
Tamayo v. City of Harlingen.230 Tamayo, an employee of the city of Har-
lingen, was killed by inhalation of a deadly gas while working at a city
sewage lift station. The issue on appeal was whether Tamayo's surviving
children were entitled to maintain a suit against Harlingen for exemplary
damages. The children relied upon article 16, section 26 of the Texas Con-
stitution, which provides: "Every. . .corporation. . . that may commit a
homicide, through wilful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall be respon-
sible, in exemplary damages .... ',231 The court rejected the children's
argument that they had a constitutional right to pursue their claim for ex-
emplary damages because Harlingen was a municipal corporation. Find-
ing Duhart controlling, the court affirmed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment for Harlingen. 232
221. Id
222. Id at 591-92.
223. Id
224. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1982).
225. 610 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. 1980).
226. Id at 741.
227. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
228. 610 S.W.2d at 742 (emphasis in original).
229. Id at 742-43.
230. 618 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
231. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 26.
232. 618 S.W.2d at 103.
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The Texas courts of civil appeals rendered several other decisions of
note construing the Tort Claims Act.233 In City of Galveston v. ShU234 the
court of civil appeals considered section 16, the notice provision of the
Act. 235 Shu's automobile was damaged in a collision with a Galveston
Police Department van, and Shu did not comply with the claim notice
requirements in the Galveston City Charter. Thus the only proper notice
Galveston may have received was "actual notice" pursuant to section 16.
Shu's petition did not allege that conditions precedent to the cause of ac-
tion had been performed, or that notice of any sort had been given to Gal-
veston. At trial, the jury found Galveston negligent, and the court entered
judgment for Shu. The court of civil appeals affirmed.236 Because Shu had
not adequately alleged actual notice in his petition, the court determined
that Shu was not entitled to the notice presumption of Rule 93(m) of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 237 The court, however, decided that Shu
had presented sufficient evidence of probative force regarding Galveston's
actual notice to withstand a "no evidence" point since the court found that
there was circumstantial evidence that an official investigation of the acci-
dent was made by Galveston police. 238
In Palmer v. City of Benbrook the Fort Worth court of civil appeals re-
jected a claim against the city of Benbrook based on Benbrook's alleged
failure to properly design and regulate parking on its streets.239 Donald
233. For additional cases construing the Tort Claims Act, see Estate of Garza v. McAllen
Indep. School Dist., 613 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ) (section 19A
of the Act results in waiver of sovereign immunity against school district only as to injuries
and damages resulting from the "use" of motor vehicles; stabbing of student on school bus
held not to arise from the use of the bus despite allegations of bus driver negligence in
permitting non-students to use the bus, permitting armed persons to enter the bus, and fail-
mg to deter or stop violence on board); Cronen v. Nix, 611 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), afl'dsub nom. Cronen v. City of Galena Park, 102
S. Ct. 132, 70 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1981) (municipality was immune from claim of false imprison-
ment because operation of police department is a governmental function and because
§ 14(10) of the Act specifically excluded claims of false imprisonment from the acts allowed
against a municipality); State v. Nichols, 609 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.) (section 3 of the Act established liability for injuries due to "some condition or
use of real property," in this case a huge washout on a state highway, and there was evidence
to support the findings of DPS officers' negligence); Duson v. Midland County Indep.
School Dist., 627 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981) (a school district is a state
agency immune from suit while exercising governmental functions except for limited immu-
nity waiver for use of motor vehicles; furnishing of swings for school children on playground
is a governmental function).
234. 607 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
235. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
236. 607 S.W.2d at 946.
237. Id at 944-945. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(m) requires that one file a verified pleading
"[t]hat notice and proof of loss or claim for damage has not been given, as alleged." Rule
93(m) further provides: "Unless such plea is fied such notice and proof shall be presumed
and no evidence to the contrary shall be admitted. A denial of such notice or such proof
shall be made specifically and with particularity." If Shu had adequately alleged actual
notice, he would have been entitled to Rule 93(m)'s presumption, and Galveston could not
have presented contrary evidence because Galveston's verified answer had not specifically
denied actual notice. 607 S.W.2d at 944. The court's discussion highlights the need for
careful attention to pleading notice and lack of notice.
238. 607 S.W.2d at 945-46.
239. 607 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)
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Palmer and his daughter Karen were injured when they ran head on into
another moving car at the crest of a hill in Benbrook. The collision alleg-
edly resulted from the narrowness of the street and Benbrook's parking
and traffic policies. The Palmers' cause of action against Benbrook in-
volved three alternative theories: negligence; "special defect" liability
under the Tort Claims Act; and nuisance. The court of civil appeals re-
jected each theory, and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for
Benbrook. 24° With regard to the negligence theory, the court stated that
Benbrook had the discretionary right under Texas law to decide the width
of its streets, and therefore was protected by governmental immunity.241
The court stated that the law "is also well settled in Texas that the regula-
tion, by municipalities, of traffic and parking on city streets, pursuant to
their police power, is a governmental function. '242 Since the case involved
only the claim that Benbrook's regulations caused a hazardous condition,
the court rejected the argument that a mixed governmental and proprie-
tary function was involved that would make Benbrook accountable for any
negligence by those acting for it.243 Benbrook, therefore, was immune
from any common law liability, because only governmental functions were
challenged. The court also rejected Palmer's nuisance claim.2 "4 Although
recognizing that municipalities can be liable under a nuisance theory in
certain situations, the court stated that "[b]efore a city can be liable for
creating or maintaining a nuisance, there must be something inherently
dangerous in the very thing or condition claimed to be the nuisance, and
must be a danger beyond that arising from negligence in its mainte-
nance. '245 The court found the real basis for Palmer's claim to be negli-
gence, not nuisance, and held her nuisance allegation unsupportable as a
matter of law.246
The court of civil appeals also rejected Palmer's Tort Claims Act
claims.247 First, Palmer claimed that Benbrook's decision not to widen the
lanes on the street in question brought her within the language of section 3
of the Act providing for liability for "death or personal injuries ...
caused from some condition or some use of tangible property, real or per-
sonal. '248 Palmer relied on Lowe v. Texas Tech University,249 in which the
Texas Supreme Court found liability under section 3 for failure to furnish
protective items of personal property. Lowe creates interpretive difficulties
regarding when nonuse of property will result in liability under the Act.250
240. Id at 301.
241. Id at 298.
242. Id
243. -Id
244. Id at 300.
245. Id (citing Callaway v. City of Odessa, 602 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1980, no writ)).
246. Id at 300-01.
247. Id at 299-300.
248. Id at 299. TEx. REV. Civ, STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
249. 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976).
250. See Note, The Problem of Construing Section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act-Lowe
v. Texas Tech University and its Progeny, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 94 (1979).
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The court of civil appeals in Palmer, however, found no such difficulty.
Relying on the discretionary nature of decisions regarding the regulation
and control of traffic, the court found no waiver of immunity in section 3's
language for a claim based upon the failure to widen traffic lanes.251 In
support of this result -the court cited section 14(7) of the Act, 252 stating that
that section "exempts governmental units from claims [under the Act]
based upon the failure of a unit of government to perform a discretionary
act."' 253 Section 14(7) may prove a useful tool for governments attempting
to avoid the Act's waiver of immunity, although a difficult problem in de-
termining what is a discretionary and what is a ministerial act often may
arise.254
Finally, Palmer argued that a car parked legally on the road in question
constituted an unsafe obstruction and was therefore a special defect under
sections 14(12) and 18(b) of the Act 255 of which Benbrook failed to give
warning. The court indicated that a legally parked car at the crest of a hill
is not a special defect under the cited sections. 256 The court held that a
legally parked car on a narrow passageway is a hazard normally connected
with the use of a roadway, and that under section 14(12), therefore, Ben-
brook could not be liable for failure to warn of the hazard because the
failure to warn was "'the result of discretionary actions of said govern-
mental unit.' "257
The discretionary act exception of section 14(7) was also construed in a
way highly favorable to the governmental unit in University of Texas at
Arlington v. Akers.258 Akers, a student at the University of Texas at Ar-
lington, sued the University for personal injuries sustained when he
slipped and fell on an allegedly icy University parking lot. Akers claimed
to be a business invitee of the University under section 18(b) of the Act.259
The jury found that the University had not negligently failed to salt or
sand the parking lot, but had negligently failed to cancel classes on the day
in question, and Akers received a judgment from which the University
appealed. The Fort Worth court of civil appeals reversed, sustaining the
251. 607 S.W.2d at 299.
252. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(7) (Vernon 1970) provides that the
provisions of the Act do not apply to:
Any claim based upon the failure of a unit of government to perform any act
which said unit of government is not required by law to perform. If the law
leaves the performance or nonperformance of an act to the discretion of the
unit of government, its decision not to do the act, or its failure to make a
decision thereon, shall not form the basis for a claim under this Act.
253. 607 S.W.2d at 299.
254. See Note, The "Policy Decision" Exemption of the Texas Tort Claims Act.- State v.
Terrell, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 403 (1980). The author concludes that "[ilronically, the passage
of the Texas Tort Claims Act, which was intended to avoid the arbitrary results of the pro-
prietary-governmental distinction, may have introduced a new distinction which will be just
as difficult to apply." Id at 413.
255. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, §§ 14(12) & 18(b) (Vernon 1970).
256. 607 S.W.2d at 300.
257. Id at 300 (citing TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(12) (Vernon 1970).
258. 607 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)
259. Id at 284. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(b) (Vernon 1970).
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University's contention that the University was immune from suit because
the decision not to cancel classes was a discretionary act and, therefore,
was expressly made nonactionable by section 14(7) of the Act. 260 State v.
TerreI 261 in which the Texas Supreme Court explained that section 14(7)
was designed to avoid judicial review of the wisdom of a government's
exercise of its discretion in making policy decisions was cited by the
court. 2 6 2 The court of civil appeals' analysis in Akers, however, does not
appear to follow Terre/I's apparent framework allowing liability for the
negligent implementation of policy but disallowing liability for the formu-
lation of discretionary policy decisions. 263 The court of civil appeals noted
that the University had a policy to close classes in extremely bad weather,
and that the University gathered the facts on the day in question and then
decided not to cancel classes. 264 Although the jury found this noncancella-
tion of classes to be negligent, the court, despite the University's apparent
negligent implementation of its policy, said the University was "following
its policy" and had the discretion whether to or not to cancel classes. 265
The University was thus protected from liability by section 14(7).266
The fine distinctions between an invitee, a licensee, and a trespasser are
discussed in Rowland v. City of Corpus Christi.267 Rowland sued the city of
Corpus Christi for personal injuries sustained when he dove from a sea-
wall into the marina waters of Corpus Christi Bay. The trial court granted
a take nothing judgment to Corpus Christi notwithstanding a jury verdict
for Rowland; the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals affirmed.268 First,
the court determined that Rowland was not an invitee, because there was
no relation of mutual benefit between Corpus Christi and the plaintiff.269
Next, the court decided that Rowland could not recover under the facts,
whether he was a licensee or a trespasser. 270 If Rowland was a trespasser,
Corpus Christi only owed him the duty not to injure him willfully, wan-
tonly or through gross negligence, and Rowland made no allegations of
such intent or conduct.27' If Rowland was a licensee, Corpus Christi owed
him the duty to warn about or make safe any dangerous conditions about
which it had actual knowledge. 272 The court found that there was no evi-
260. 607 S.W.2d at 285-86.
261. 588 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. 1979).
262. 607 S.W.2d at 285.
263. See 588 S.W.2d at 788.
264. 607 S.W.2d at 285.
265. Id
266. Id at 285-86.
267. 620 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ reftd n.r.e.). This ap-
pears to be a proprietary tort case primarily; the court does not reach the only Tort Claims
Act issue presented.
268. Id at 935.
269. Id at 933. There was no admission charge, and Corpus Christi had not invited
plaintiff onto the premises. Id at 934. If plaintiff was an invitee, Corpus Christi "had a duty
to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to inspect the premises to discover
any latent defects and to make safe any defect or give adequate warning." Id at 933.
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dence that Corpus Christi had actual knowledge of dangerous subsurface
conditions or of the dangerous condition on which plaintiff struck his
head.2
73
Liability under 42 US C, Section 1983. During the survey period the
courts again dealt with many claims against local governments based upon
the federal cause of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C., section 1983.274
A detailed analysis of developments under section 1983 is not feasible
here. This section will, however, outline the holdings of survey period
Supreme Court decisions and certain Fifth Circuit decisions.
The Supreme Court took a restrictive view of section 1983 in several
decisions. Punitive damages were ruled unavailable against municipalities
in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 275 The Court held that a federal
plaintiff may be precluded under collateral estoppel principles from reliti-
gating an issue raised and determined against him at his state civil or crim-
inal trial in Allen v. McCurry.276 In Parralt v. Taylor the Court found that
state tort remedies for wrongful conduct could satisfy the requirements of
due process and negate a section 1983 due process claim based upon the
wrongful conduct.2 77 Finally, section 1983 was held not to supply a rem-
edy for all violations of federal law by state officials in Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association .278 One decision
was more expansive. In Dennis v. Sparks279 the Court ruled that private
individuals who allegedly bribed a state trial judge to issue an injunction
are not shielded from liability by the judge's absolute immunity.
Several Fifth Circuit decisions also dealt with section 1983. In Patsy v.
Florida International University the Fifth Circuit ruled that when a state
provides adequate and appropriate administrative remedies, an aggrieved
person must exhaust those remedies before filing a section 1983 action,
unless one of the traditional exceptions to the general exhaustion rule is
applicable. 280  The court in Wright v. Wagner ruled that evidence sup-
273. Id at 934-35.
274. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
275. 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981). Punitive damages, however, are allowable
against an offending official individually. Id at 2761.
276. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
277. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The Court also apparently holds that § 1983 can reach negli-
gent conduct. Id at 1911-13. One writer states that the Parratt decision "could lead to a
sweeping curtailment of federal civil rights litigation in favor of state courts and remedies,"
and "ultimately may restrict 14th Amendment due process or equal protection litigation to
challenges to official policies or practices directly attributable to the state as an entity, leav-
ing individual acts of official misconduct by state officers to be remedied under state law."
Kirby, Demoting 14th Amendment Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A.J. 166, 167 (1982).
278. 101 S. Ct. 2615, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981).
279. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
280. 634 F.2d 900, 912 (5th Cir. 1981).
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ported the jury's finding that a prisoner who allegedly committed suicide
should not have been suspected of insanity by his jailers.281 The jailers,
therefore, did not violate a Texas statute requiring that the suspected in-
sane be placed in a padded cell.28 2 The court also stated that the mere
failure to comply with the Texas statute would not by itself constitute cruel
and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment, absent "de-
liberate indifference to [the incarcerated's] condition and the likely conse-
quences of that condition. '283
In Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the mayor
of the city of Lafayette was entitled to absolute immunity for acts taken in
his legislative capacity, here the veto of an ordinance, and that Lafayette
was not entitled to immunity from damages in connection with its zoning
regulations. 284 The court concluded that "an action for damages will lie
under § 1983 in favor of any person whose property is taken for public use
without just compensation by a municipality through a zoning regulation
that denies the owner any economically viable use thereof'. 285
The Fifth Circuit faced the problem of determining whether a battery
amounted to a constitutional deprivation in Shillingford v. Holmes.286 A
police officer struck the plaintiff, who was photographing four or five po-
licemen apprehending a boy during Mardi Gras. The plaintiffs camera
was destroyed and his forehead lacerated. The court noted that not every
personal hurt by a state officer constitutes a violation of the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of due process of law, but stated that in this case
the officer crossed the constitutional boundary,287 considering "the amount
of force used in relationship to the need presented, the extent of the injury
inflicted and the motives of the state officer."' 288 The court also noted that
punitive damages might be recoverable under these circumstances. 28 9 The
court in York v. City of Cedartown290 also faced the question whether a
constitutional violation had been established, but reached a result different
from the result in Shillingford. Plaintiffs alleged that Cedartown had neg-
ligently designed and built a street and drainage system, resulting in water
and sewage being deposited on their property during periods of excessive
rainfall. The court found that the plaintiffs did not meet the test of Wil-
liams v. Kelly29 1 requiring that a section 1983 plaintiff must prove a depri-
281. 641 F.2d 239, 241 (5th Cir. 1981).
282. Id See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5115 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
283. 641 F.2d at 242.
284. 643 F.2d 1188, 1194-97 (5th Cir. 1981). The court cites Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) for the proposition that local legislators are entitled to absolute
immunity from suit under § 1983 for conduct in furtherance of their duties. Id at 1193.
More importantly, Owen established that a municipality can be liable in damages even if the
responsible official is immune from liability. Id
285. Id at 1200.
286. 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981).
287. Id at 265-66.
288. Id at 265.
289. Id at 266.
290. 648 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1981).
291. 624 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1980).
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vation of a federal constitutional right which resulted from "'the sort of
abuse of government power that is necessary to raise an ordinary tort by a
government agent to the stature of a violation of the Constitution.' 292
In Collins v. Thomas the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court had prop-
erly awarded attorney fees against Dallas County, even though the county
was not a named party.293 The circuit determined that the sheriffs person-
nel decisions could fairly be said to represent county policy and that no
special circumstances rendering such an award unjust existed.294
A directed verdict for the defendant hospital officials was affirmed in
Dilmore v. Stubbs.295 A mental patient claimed that the officials had de-
prived him of his constitutional right to be held in a setting that least re-
stricted his civil rights and liberties. The court held that the defendants
were immune from suit under the dual subjective objective qualified im-
munity test of Wood v. Strickland,296 because the plaintiff did not allege
subjective malicious intent to harm him, and the defendants' actions, in
view of the state of constitutional law regarding government treatment of
mental patients, were not clearly in contravention of the Constitution.
297
The officials, therefore, could not have known that plaintiff's constitutional
rights might be violated.298
Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Douthit v. Jones,2 99 on petition for rehear-
ing, considered a Texas sheriffs liability for false imprisonment in light of
the holding of Baskin v. Parker3°° that a supervisory official cannot be held
liable for his subordinates' unlawful actions under section 1983 on the ba-
sis of vicarious liability. The court pointed out that a supervisory official
may be responsible under section 1983 if a causal connection exists be-
tween the official's act and the alleged constitutional violation, and that
breach of a duty imposed by state or local law with resulting constitutional
injury can establish such a causal connection. 30' The circuit determined
that a section 1983 action can be based upon violation of article 5116,302
which imposes a duty upon a Texas sheriff to incarcerate only those per-
sons whom he lawfully may imprison.30 3 A sheriff, however, "may satisfy
this duty by adopting reasonable internal procedures to ensure that only
those persons are incarcerated for whom the sheriff, or the deputy to whom
he delegates such responsibilities, has a good faith belief based upon objec-
tive circumstances that he possesses valid legal authority to imprison. ''3°4
292. 648 F.2d at 232 (citing Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1980)).
293. 649 F.2d 1203, 1205 (5th Cir. 1981).
294. Id
295. 636 F.2d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 1981).
296. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
297. 636 F.2d at 968-71.
298. Id
299. 641 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1981).
300. 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979).
301. 641 F.2d at 346.
302. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5116 (Vernon 1971).
303. 641 F.2d at 346.




The Municipal Annexation Act was amended by the 67th Legislature in
several respects. Section VI of the Act was amended to require any city
planning to institute annexation proceedings to hold public hearings on
the matter not more than forty days not less than twenty days prior to
institution of the proceedings.30 5 Section ten of the Act was amended to
require the governing body of a city proposing annexation to prepare a
service plan providing for the extension of municipal services into the area
to be annexed. 3°6 The amendment also provides that any area disannexed
under this section shall not be reannexed within five years of such disan-
nexation.307 Additionally, while repealing the poll tax the Legislature also
amended section nine of the Municipal Annexation Act to provide a pro-
cedure for petitioning for annexation. 308 The Legislature also passed an
act extending junior college district boundaries to include adjacent school
district or noncontiguous school districts.3°9
The Texas Supreme Court construed the Municipal Annexation Act 310
in City of West Orange v. State.31' The case involved a suit by West Or-
ange against Orange requesting judicial apportionment of overlapping ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction between the two cities. Orange filed a cross-
action against West Orange concerning the apportionment. Additionally,
West Orange challenged an Orange city ordinance creating an industrial
buffer strip. Sometime later, Orange brought a quo warranto proceeding
challenging a West Orange election amending its city charter and annex-
ing land allegedly within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Orange. All of
these legal proceedings concerned the two cities' right to an industrial
buffer strip or zone. The industrial buffer strip created by the city of Or-
ange was fifteen-feet wide and touched the city of Orange for fifteen feet
on either end and touched the city of West Orange for approximately 1.8
miles on one side. In addition, it encircled a large industrial area not an-
nexed by any other city.
The trial court upheld the Orange annexation ordinance, that created a
fifteen-foot wide buffer strip around a chemical row industrial area.312
The Texas Supreme Court previously had ruled a similar strip annexation
of nonadjacent territory invalid. 313 The court of appeals also upheld the
ordinance and distinguished prior Texas Supreme Court authority, based
upon a validating statute passed by the Texas Legislature.314 Similar vali-
dation statutes had been passed by the legislature "for years" and provided
305. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
306. Id § 10.
307. Id
308. Id § 9.
309. T'mx. EDUC. CODE AN. § 130.063 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
310. T"x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982).
311. 613 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. 1981).
312. City of W. Orange v. State, 598 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980).
313. City of Pasadena v. State, 442 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1969).




"in very broad language" that the boundary lines of certain cities and
towns, including both the boundary lines covered by the original and cor-
poration proceedings and by any subsequent extension, were validated.
31 5
In construing the validating statute the supreme court ruled that the leg-
islature repeatedly had limited the extension of any city or town to contig-
uous and adjacent areas; therefore, in the absence of specific and express
provisions in the validating statutes that annexed, land need not be adja-
cent.316 The court refused to give the validating statute such a construc-
tion.317 In addition, the court found that the Municipal Annexation Act
provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction and the Act specifically forbade
the annexation by one city of land in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
another.318 The supreme court found the Orange industrial buffer strip
ordinance invalid because the strip was neither adjacent to Orange when
the ordinance was passed nor adjacent at any subsequent time.319 Because
the supreme court found that apportionment of overlapping extraterrito-
rial areas between towns and cities with conflicting claims was within the
province of the trial court it remanded the case to the district court.320 The
lower court was directed to consider the apportionment of the overlapping
extraterritorial jurisdiction of Orange and West Orange.
VII. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS
Courts during the survey period considered several important issues in-
volving officers and employees of local governments. The cases discussed
in this section involve such issues as whether a commissioners court must
set a reasonable salary for a constable, the applicability of the Texas nepo-
tism law, a public employee's right to due process before termination, the
constitutionality of disciplinary rules, whether deputy sheriffs have the
right to bargain collectively, and the immunity from tort liability of Texas
officers and employees. Also discussed are several cases construing the
Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act.3
21
Constable's Right to Reasonable Salary. In Vondy v. Commissioners
Court,322 the Texas Supreme Court considered an appeal from a manda-
mus action against four of the five members of the Uvalde County Com-
missioners Court brought by Vondy, a duly elected constable in Uvalde
County. The trial court entered judgment denying Vondy's request that
the commissioners court set a reasonable salary for his office. The East-
land court of civil appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed
the action, holding that the failure to join the fifth commissioner was fun-
315. See 613 S.W.2d at 239.
316. Id at 239-40.
317. Id at 239.
318. Id
319. Id at 239-40.
320. Id at 240.
321. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982).
322. 620 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1981).
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damental error because he was an indispensable party to the suit.323 The
supreme court reversed, concluding that under Rule 39 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure the fifth commissioner was not an indispensable party
to the suit, and that the fact that a mandamus action was involved did not
affect this result.324 Further, the supreme court held that article 16, section
61 of the Texas Constitution3 25 "clearly mandates that constables receive a
salary. ' 326 The court stated that the commissoners court must pay Vondy
a "reasonable" salary, and remanded to the district court for proceedings
consistent with its opinion.327 The court reasoned that the district court
should have granted the mandamus because of the failure of the commis-
sioners court to comply with its duty to set a reasonable salary and because
constables, who act in part as process servers, must be paid in order to
protect the integrity of the judicial branch of Texas government.3 28
Nepotism. The issue in Pena v. Rio Grande City Consolidated Independent
School District329 was whether the superintendent of the school district
was subject to the prohibition of article 5996a 330 against official nepotism.
The plaintiff alleged that the school district's superintendent, as "chief ad-
ministrative officer" of the district, appointed his wife to a teaching posi-
tion in the district in violation of article 5996a. The trial court sustained
the defendants' special exception that the superintendent was not subject
to article 5996a because he was an employee of the school district rather
than an "officer."'331 The Eastland court of civil appeals affirmed, finding
that a superintendent was not an officer, but rather an employee.332 Dis-
agreeing with an opinion of the attorney general,333 the court applied the
test stated by the Texas Supreme Court in Aldine Independent School Dis-
trict v. Standley.334 TheAldine test for determining who is a public officer
is "whether any sovereign function of the government is conferred upon
the individual to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public largely
independent of the control of others ' 5 A school superintendent, said the
court of civil appeals, "merely performs functions delegated to him by the
trustees who do not by such delegation abdicate their statutory authority
or control," and is therefore not an officer for purposes of the nepotism
323. 601 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980).
324. 620 S.W.2d at 105-08.
325. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 61.
326. 620 S.W.2d at 108.
327. Id. at 109.
328. Id at 109-10.
329. 616 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
330. TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ArNN. art. 5996a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
331. 616 S.W.2d at 659. TEx. REv. CtV. STAT. ANN. art. 5996a (Vernon Supp. 1982)
prohibits an "officer" of a school district from involvement in the employment of a relative.
332. 616 S.W.2d at 659.
333. TEx. ATr'y. GEN. Op. No. MW-56 (1979) (a school superintendent may be an of-
ficer for purposes of the nepotism statutes when the superintendent de facto controls the
hiring of teachers).
334. 280 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1955).
335. Id at 583 (quoting Dunbar v. Brazoria County, 224 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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statutes. 336
Employee's Right to Due Process Upon Termination. In Snell v. Hidalgo
County Water Improvement District No. 2337 an employee of the Hidalgo
County Water Improvement District, fired for drinking on the job, brought
a federal civil rights suit alleging that the district discharged him without
according him procedural due process. The employee did not have a writ-
ten contract with the district, and there were no written rules regarding
terms of employment or termination procedures or fixed terms of employ-
ment. The district court rendered judgment that plaintiff take nothing,
finding that plaintiff had not demonstrated a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to continued employment. 338 The court concluded that "[i]n the case
at bar, neither state law nor any rules or mutual understandings support
Plaintiff's contention that he possessed a property interest in his employ-
ment. '339 The district court construed section 58.091 of the Texas Water
Code34° as permitting water districts to remove employees at will. Finding
no rules or understandings between the plaintiff and the water district that
would support a claim of entitlement, the court noted that Texas common
law allowed private employees in plaintiff's situation to be discharged at
will.34 1 Absent any cognizable property interest, the court determined that
plaintiff had no actionable right to procedural due process upon
termination.342
Constitutionality of Disciplinary Rules. Bickel v. Burkhart343 raised the is-
sue of the constitutionality of certain municipal fire department discipli-
nary rules.344 In response to a Garland firemen's pay scale controversy, a
meeting was held at which a Garland administrator made a presentation
regarding comparative fire department pay scales. Burkhart, chief of the
fire department, Bickel, a fireman, and one other fireman were present at
the meeting. At the conclusion of the administrator's presentation, ques-
tions and comments were invited. Bickel responded with complaints con-
cerning the fire department and some of its equipment. Two months later
336. 616 S.W.2d at 660.
337. 507 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
338. The court stated that "procedural due process applies only when the state has de-
prived a person of a liberty or property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id at 836.
339. Id
340. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 58.091 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
341. 507 F. Supp. at 836-37.
342. Id at 837.
343. 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980).
344. In the related case of Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981) the Fifth
Circuit ruled that a sheriff could not demote or remove deputies on the basis of their polit-
ical affiliations. The court held that regulations prohibiting unauthorized public statements,
speaking to reporters on any controversial topic, and discussion of sheriff office policy or
procedure with any elected official were facially overbroad and invaded protected free
speech, but that regulations prohibiting "conduct subversive of the good order or discipline
of the department" and the use of "abusive, insulting or indecent language to a supervisory
officer" were facially constitutional. Id at 1198-99.
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Bickel took and passed a civil service examination to obtain a promotion
from firefighter to driver engineer, but Burkhart denied the promotion on
the grounds that Bickel's conduct at the meeting and his general attitude
violated certain fire department rules and regulations. Those regulations
included prohibitions against "conduct prejudicial to good order" and
"malicious gossip . . . that would tend to disrupt department morale or
bring discredit to the department. '345
Bickel filed a civil rights suit in federal district court alleging that the
rules and regulations cited by Burkhart were unconstitutional facially and
as applied to the specific circumstances surrounding the denial of his pro-
motion. The district court held for Bickel, declaring the challenged rules
unconstitutional, and finding that Bickel's constitutional rights were vio-
lated when his promotion was denied because of his critical comments at
the meeting. The district court ruled that Bickel be made whole moneta-
rily and included an award for attorney's fees.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's conclusions that
the fire department's rules were unconstitutional,346 but affirmed the
court's holding that Bickel's criticisms were the cause of his promotion de-
nial, and that those criticisms were constitutionally protected. 347 Using the
Pickering v. Board of Education348 balancing test, the court found that
Bickel's first amendment rights outweighed the city's interest in promoting
efficient public services, since Bickel's criticisms were directed at the de-
partment as an institution rather than any individual and were made in
response to the invitation to comment.349 The court also found that the
criticisms created no actual interference with the operation of the fire
department.310
Collective Bargaining for Deputy Sheriffs. The Fire and Police Employees
Relation Act 35' provides a system of arbitration between police and fire
department employees and their public employers, and prohibits strikes
and lockouts. The Act becomes applicable after a popular vote in "cities,
towns, or other political subdivisions. ' 35 2 When a petition for such a vote
is presented to the governing body an election must be called. 353
345. 632 F.2d at 1253.
346. Id at 1254-55. The court cited Davis v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980) for
the proposition that the "conduct prejudicial to good order" regulation was constitutional.
632 F.2d at 1254-55. The court's conclusion upholding the constitutionality of the "mali-
cious gossip" rule was accompanied by language limiting the rule to false statements made
knowingly or with reckless disregard of the truth. Id at 1255.
347. 632 F.2d at 1256.
348. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Court articulated the balancing test as follows: "The
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees." Id at 568.
349. 632 F.2d at 1256-57.
350. Id. at 1258.
351. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c--- (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
352. Id § 4.
353. Id § 5(b).
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After being presented with a technically correct petition, the El Paso
Commissioners Court refused to hold an election on whether to permit the
El Paso County Sheriff's Deputies Association to bargain collectively on
behalf of the deputies. In Commissioners' Court v. El Paso County Sherffs
Deputies Association the district court issued a writ of mandamus ordering
the commissioners' court to hold the election. 354 The issues on appeal to
the El Paso court of civil appeals were whether the Act applied to county
deputy sheriffs and whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony
of a state representative concerning legislative intent. The court held that
the Act does apply to counties,355 and that the admission of the legislator's
testimony was harmless error.356 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial
court.
3 5 7
Immunity from Tort Liability. Texas law in the area of the individual im-
munity of government officers and employees from tort liability is rela-
tively undeveloped, and what law does exist fails to provide clear
guidelines. In the present survey period, several courts struggled with im-
munity issues.
One of the more instructive efforts is the San Antonio court of civil ap-
peals decision of Baker v. Story,358 a medical malpractice action. -Baker
was shot in the leg, and after experiencing pain for several months he was
examined by a Dr. Miller, a resident at the University of Texas Health
Science Center, a part of the University of Texas Medical School. The
defendant, Dr. Story, was head of the neurological-surgery department of
the medical school facility. Dr. Miller performed a surgical procedure on
Baker involving the excision of a nerve section; Baker presented evidence
that upon instructions from Dr. Story, Dr. Miller cut Baker's right ureter
rather than the nerve. The mistake was immediately identified, the nerve
excision then correctly performed, and an attempt made to repair the
ureter damage. Nevertheless, Baker developed urological problems re-
quiring rehospitalization. Baker first filed a state court suit against Miller
and Story. He then filed suit in federal court under the Federal Tort
Claims Act against Miller, who was an active member of the United States
Air Force practicing as a resident at the hospital under an exchange pro-
gram. The federal court concluded that Baker had failed to establish
Miller's negligence, and Baker did not appeal from a take nothing judg-
ment.359 The state court then rendered a summary judgment for Story and
Miller on the ground that the federal court had determined conclusively
the issue of Miller's negligence against Baker.360 On a first appeal, the
354. 620 S.W.2d 900, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
355. Id at 902.
356. Id The legislator co-authored the Act. He testified that he intended the Act to
include deputy sheriffs and counties, but the court concluded that "[n]o single member [of
the legislature] can be heard to say what the meaning of the statute is." Id
357. Id at 903.
358. 621 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).




court of civil appeals affirmed as to Dr. Miller, but remanded for trial on
the merits as to Dr. Story's alleged negligence.361 On remand, the trial
court instructed a verdict in favor of Dr. Story.362
On appeal again, the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded.363
The court adhered to its earlier ruling that Baker was not collaterally es-
topped from proceeding against Dr. Story.364 Furthermore, the court
ruled that there was more than a scintilla of evidence of the standard of
care applicable to Dr. Story and of a deviation from such standard. 365
The court of civil appeals also held that the instructed verdict could not
be upheld based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity.366 Dr. Story
asserted that the evidence established that he was an employee of the State
of Texas, that he was working within the course and scope of his employ-
ment, and that the action against him individually was barred by the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. Initially, the court noted that Dr. Story had
his terms wrong.367 Sovereign immunity shields the sovereign from liabil-
ity; therefore when the "question concerns the liability of a governmental
officer or employee, rather than the liability of the sovereign itself, the
problem is one of official immunity, not of sovereign immunity.'' 368 Fur-
ther, the question of sovereign immunity, the court said, is a separate and
distinct question from the question of the immunity of public servants
from liability for their torts.369 The court then noted that "Texas courts, in
granting immunity, have distinguished between judicial officers, quasi-ju-
dicial personnel and ministerial functionaries. ' 370 A judge has absolute
immunity for acts within his jurisdiction; a quasi-judicial public servant
enjoys immunity "as long as he acts in good faith within the scope of his
authority."' 37' If the public servant has a "mere ministerial" post, however,
"he is liable for his tortious conduct to the same extent as a person who
holds no government position. ' 372 The court recognized, though, that the
identification of categories only starts the inquiry and in fact that these
categories do not provide a satisfactory framework for analysis:
The distinction between 'quasi-judicial' and 'ministerial' duties is not
only a finespun distinction; it is, for practical purposes, unworkable.
It is said that 'quasi-judicial' acts are 'discretionary' in character, re-
quiring personal deliberation, decision and judgment, while 'ministe-
rial' acts require only obedience to orders, or the performance of a
duty as to which the actor is left no choice of his own. "It seems
almost impossible to draw any clear and definite line, since the dis-
361. Baker v. Story, 564 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
362. 621 S.W.2d at 640.
363. Id at 646.
364. Id at 641-42.
365. Id at 642-43.




370. Id at 644.
371. Id
372. Id at 645.
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tinction, if it exists, can be at most one of degree. 'It would be difficult
to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that
did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance,
even if it involved only the driving of a nail.'"373
Applying its analysis to the case before it, the court rejected, as obviously
overbroad, the language of one Texas court that public officers are not
liable to individuals for acts done within the scope of their public duties.374
Considering the liability of a teacher-public employee, the court said that
in the absence of a statute to the contrary Texas law appears to hold teach-
ers liable for injuries caused by their negligence. 375 The court found that
the evidence did not establish as a matter of law the nature and extent of
Dr. Story's duties or whether his duties were of a nature that must be clas-
sified as "quasi-judicial. ' 376 Neither did the evidence establish that Dr.
Story's duties differed "from those of an ordinary teacher who, in the ab-
sence of statutory provisions to the contrary, will be held liable for injuries
resulting from his negligence. '377 The court noted that it was not holding
that medical malpractice actions definitely could be brought against doc-
tors employed by state medical facilities stating: "We do no more than
hold that, under the evidence in this case, it was not conclusively estab-
lished that Dr. Story was entitled to immunity as an employee of the State
of Texas."'378
The liability of a public school teacher also was considered in 0"'Haver v.
Blair,379 in which the court of civil appeals construed the immunity section
of the Texas Educational Code, section 21.912(b). 380 Shawn O'Haver was
a fifteen-year old high school student playing football on the high school
practice football field on a Sunday afternoon. Football coaches attending
a coaches meeting at the school told the players to leave, but they refused.
A coach named Blair pushed O'Haver, the two struggled and Blair struck
O'Haver in the mouth, knocking out two of his teeth. O'Haver sued Blair
for actual and exemplary damages. The trial court sustained Blair's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the ground that he was immune from lia-
bility under section 21.912(b). The court of civil appeals reversed and
remanded, finding that the summary judgment proof did not establish any
of the following essential elements necessary to sustain a section 21.912(b)
373. Id (citation omitted).
374. Id The court discussed and quoted Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301, 311 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1959, writ refd n.r.e.).
375. 621 S.W.2d at 644-45.
376. Id at 645.
377. Id
378. Id at 646.
379. 619 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
380. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.912(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
No professional employee of any school district within this state shall be per-
sonally liable for any act incident to or within the scope of the duties of his
position of employment, and which act involves the exercise of judgment or
discretion on the part of the employee, except in circumstances where profes-
sional employees use excessive force in the discipline of students or negligence
resulting in bodily injury to students.
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immunity defense: (1) that Blair "was acting incident to or within the
scope of the duties of his position;" (2) that the questioned acts "involved
the exercise of judgment or discretion;" and (3) that Blair "was not disci-
plining" O'Haver.381
The Amarillo court of civil appeals faced a different type of immunity
issue in Steele v. Barbian.382 In 1976, Amarillo widened a street necessitat-
ing the relocation of fire hydrants. In 1977, a house near one of the relo-
cated hydrants owned by Ross Bell and leased by Kathy Steele caught fire.
Responding firemen found water was not supplied to the hydrant. Evi-
dence later showed that the water valve was closed. By the time water was
secured, the house was destroyed. Steele and Bell filed suit against the city
of Amarillo and others. Amarillo secured a summary judgment based
upon its governmental immunity from suit for the performance of fire pro-
tection, a governmental function; this summary judgment was not ap-
pealed. After nonsuiting the other defendants in the original suit, Steele
and Bell brought a separate suit against Barbian, the city's water distribu-
tion supervisor, alleging various negligent acts. The trial court granted
Barbian's motion for summary judgment based upon governmental immu-
nity, res judicata, collateral estoppel and estoppel by judgment.383 The
Amarillo court of civil appeals affirmed.384 The court rejected Steele and
Bell's assertion that Barbian's negligence in the performance of his duties
related to the waterworks system, a proprietary function, and therefore
raised an issue not involved in the first case.385 Finding that the two suits
involved the same subject matter, the negligent failure to provide water to
the fire hydrant, the court found the action against Barbian barred by sec-
tion 12(a) of the Texas Tort Claims Act. 386 Further, the court found that
Barbian would be immune from suit even if the statutory bar did not ap-
ply.387 The court stated that the summary judgment proof all bore on
Barbian's actions relating to Amarillo's fire protection function, which was
a governmental function.388 The court pointed out that Amarillo was not
liable for the performance by its officers and employees of a governmental
function, and stated that "the individual performing the governmental
function of providing fire protection can be charged with no greater re-
sponsibility than that imposed on the city." 389
The responsibility of Texas sheriffs for the acts of their deputies was
381. 619 S.W.2d at 468.
382. 620 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
383. Id at 876-77. The res judicata, collateral estoppel, and estoppel by judgment points
were based primarily on TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 12(a) (Vernon 1970),
which provides: "The judgment or settlement in an action or claim under this Act shall
constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the subject matter,
against the employee of a unit of government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."
384. 620 S.W.2d at 878.
385. Id. at 877.
386. Id at 877; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANNr. art. 6252-19, § 12(a) (Vernon 1970).
387. 620 S.W.2d at 877-78.
388. Id at 878.
389. Id The approach taken by the Steele court appears to differ from that taken by the
court in Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd
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considered by a federal district court in Williams v. Thomas,390 in which a
jail inmate brought a federal civil rights assault and battery claim against
Dallas County sheriffs deputies and against Sheriff Carl Thomas. The
jury found that one deputy had used excessive force against the inmate,
and the district court entered judgment for the inmate. The claim against
Sheriff Thomas was dismissed because there was no evidence that Thomas
participated in, authorized or ratified the assault and battery, or that he
was negligent in his administration of the jail or his hiring or supervision
of deputies.391 The inmate urged, however, that Texas law made Thomas
absolutely accountable for the actions of his deputies, citing articles 5116
and 6870.392 The district court, although recognizing "the language of ab-
solute liability present in these statutes," concluded on the basis of Texas
and federal case law that when a deputy is found to have committed an
unlawful act, the deputy's sheriff was liable only when the sheriff author-
ized, participated in, or ratified the deputy's unlawful acts.393 Accordingly,
the court refused to reconsider its dismissal of Thomas.394
Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act. The Firemen's and Police-
men's Civil Service Act39 5 again provided considerable grist for the courts'
mills. The Texas Supreme Court, in fact, considered issues related to the
Act in three significant cases.396 In the first case, Taylor v. Firemen's and
Policemen's Civil Service Commission,397 the supreme court, in connection
with a dispute over the calculation of grades on promotional exams, con-
strued the meaning of the term "seniority" in section 14 of the Act.398 The
plaintiffs, police officers of the city of Lubbock, took promotional exami-
nations for the position of police corporal in 1978. The officers had served
n.r.e.), in which the court said that the issues of official and governmental immunity are
distinct and separate. See notes 358-78 supra and accompanying text.
390. 511 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
391. Id at 541.
392. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5116 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
(a) Each sheriff is the keeper of the jail of his county. He shall safely keep
therein all prisoners committed thereto by lawful authority, subject to the or-
der of the proper court, and shall be responsible for the safe keeping of such
prisoners. (b) The sheriff may appoint a jailer to take charge of the jail, and
supply the wants of those therein confined; but in all cases the sheriff shall
exercise supervision and control over the jail.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6870 (Vernon 1960) provides: "Sheriffs shall be responsible
for the official acts of their deputies, and they shall have power to require from their depu-
ties bond and security; and they shall have the same remedies against their deputies and
sureties as any person can have against a sheriff and his sureties.'
393. 511 F. Supp. at 538-41.
394. Id at 541.
395. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982).
396. The supreme court in another case, Hernandez v. City of Fort Worth, 617 S.W.2d
923, 925 (Tex. 1981), refused a writ of error, finding no reversible error in the decision of the
court of civil appeals that park rangers employed by the Fort Worth Park Department were
not "policemen subject to the Act because park rangers were not selected, appointed or
promoted to classified positions within the police department as required by the Act.
397. 616 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1981).




previously with the Lubbock police department before being rehired in
October 1977 at the lowest rank in the department. Grades on the promo-
tional exam were determined by three factors: (1) score on the written
exam; (2) departmental efficiency ratings; and (3) statutory seniority
points. When their grades first were computed, the plaintiffs received
credit for their earlier service with the department, and ranked first and
fifth on the promotion list. The grades were recomputed, however, elimi-
nating seniority points for their prior noncontinuous service, and the plain-
tiffs fell to tenth and sixth on the promotion list. The officers sued the civil
service commission to restore their original positions, and won in the trial
court. The court of civil appeals reversed, however, holding that the term
"seniority" as used in section 14 meant the last continuous year of serv-
ice.399 The supreme court reversed and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, holding that the term seniority as used in the Act "means years of
service, whether interrupted or uninterrupted, and not merely the last con-
tinuous period of service. ' '4°°
The supreme court considered another promotional dispute in Interna-
tional Association of Firefighters, Local Union No. 936 v. Townsend.40 1 In
1978, three persons passed an eligibility exam for the position of fire cap-
tain in the Corpus Christi Fire Department; at the time there were nine
authorized fire captain vacancies. The Fire Chief, however, promoted
only one of the three to the position of fire captain, acting pursuant to a
local rule of the Corpus Christi Civil Service Commission that allowed
him not to request the remaining two names to be submitted to him by the
commission for promotion. The supreme court rendered judgment for the
two employees ordering them to be promoted to the rank of fire captain.402
The court determined that section 14E of the Act mandated that the fire
chief fill the fire captain vacancies with the two employees.40 3
An indefinite suspension was challenged in Firemen's and Policemen's
Civil Service Commission v. Lockhart.4°4 In 1979, the Fort Worth Chief of
Police advised the commission that he had indefinitely suspended Lock-
hart, filing a letter setting out in detail Lockhart's misconduct. The letter
also stated that the indefinite suspension was "in consideration of his rec-
ord for the past six months. ' '4° 5 The issue before the Texas Supreme Court
was whether the reference to Lockhart's record for the past six months
rendered the suspension totally defective. Reversing the court of civil ap-
peals,4°6 the court held that the police chief had sufficiently complied with
section 16 of the Act, which requires that the letter of suspension apprise
the officer of the charges against him and the facts relied upon to prove
399. 607 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980).
400. 616 S.W.2d at 190.
401. 622 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1981).
402. Id at 563.
403. Id See TEx. REv. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 14E (Vernon Supp. 1982).
404. 626 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. 1981).
405. Id at 493.
406. 616 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981).
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those charges.407 The supreme court stated that the reference to Lock-
hart's record did not render the suspension invalid because (1) the refer-
ence was in connection with the assessment of the proper penalty, (2) the
testimony before the commission was limited to the two specifically alleged
violations, and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the two specif-
ically alleged violations, which standing alone would support the
suspension.408
One court of civil appeals decision construing the Act is of interest. 40 9
The court in Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Service Commission v. Camp-
bell410 faced the problem of reconciling apparently variant decisions by
the civil service commission and an arbitrator. Campbell, a Corpus Christi
fireman, violated a rule of the fire department requiring that certain cloth-
ing be worn while exercising on duty; Campbell also was insubordinate to
his superior when reminded of the rule. Shortly thereafter, Campbell was
passed over for promotion to the rank of fire captain; in fact, the Fire Chief
recommended that he be demoted. In January 1979, the civil service com-
mission upheld the demotion. In November 1979, however, an arbitrator
ruled that Campbell should be promoted to the position of fire captain
retroactively to November 1978.41 The district court, on appeal from both
decisions, found that there was substantial evidence to support both or-
ders. Before the court of civil appeals, the commission unsuccessfully
claimed that the arbitrator was barred by the doctrines of collateral estop-
pel and res judicata from relitigating issues determined by the commission
at its demotion hearing. The court determined that the commission's deci-
sion was not necessarily based upon the same criteria that formed the basis
of the arbitration award; the arbitrator had accepted as undisputed the
facts regarding the improper dress incident, but had determined that none-
theless Campbell should not have been bypassed for promotion.412 The
court did, however, agree that the arbitrator acted improperly in promot-
407. 626 S.W.2d at 494. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16 (Vernon 1963).
408. Id at 494-95.
409. See also Stone v. Wichita Falls, 646 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1981) (city charter provision
providing that fireman would forfeit his position if he ran for elective office inconsistent with
section 22 of the Act, which prohibits certain political activities but not the activity in which
fireman sought to engage; as a result city charter provision held void); City of San Antonio
v. Flores, 619 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no
substantial evidence in record to support civil service commission's indefinite suspension
and dismissal of fireman); City of Austin v. Gregory, 616 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1981, no writ) (writ of mandamus issued by trial court reinstating police officer
affirmed against attack that mandamus improper because police officer could have taken
direct appeal; there was evidence to support conclusion that civil service commission had not
rendered a written decision within thirty days of hearing the officer's appeal, a prerequisite
to appeal to district court); Vick v. City of Waco, 614 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff's indefinite suspension from Waco Police Department up-
held against various challenges); City of Lubbock v. Goodwin, 608 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when fireman was injured in line of duty and subse-
quent disability was result of such injury, and not result of an independent injury, fireman
was entitled to benefits of section 26 of the Act for injuries received "in the line of duty").
410. 616 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
411. Id at 425.
412. Id at 425-26.
[Vol. 36
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
ing Campbell retroactively because that would in effect overrule the prior
commission order.4 13 The court therefore modified the trial court's judg-
ment to provide that Campbell be promoted effective on the date of the
arbitrator's award.414
VIII. CONDEMNATION
Texas courts considered numerous condemnation cases during the sur-
vey period, and the Texas Legislature amended the eminent domain stat-
utes to specify the proper court for bringing a condemnation proceeding.
The Texas Supreme Court dealt with condemnation issues in three
cases. In Harris County v. Gordon, the supreme court held that a tempo-
rary injunction prohibiting Harris County from entering the landowners'
property to begin construction on a drainage project had been improperly
granted by the court of civil appeals.415 The court of civil appeals had
held that because counties were not authorized to condemn a fee simple
estate for drainage purposes, the condemnation proceeding instituted by
Harris County was void, and a temporary injunction should issue. 416
Without reaching the issue of a county's authority to condemn a fee sim-
ple, the supreme court ruled that the temporary injunction should not have
issued because the landowners had an adequate remedy at law pursuant to
article 3268(3),417 which provided that a landowner could recover damages
for the use of his land if it was finally determined that the condemnor did
not have the right to condemn.41 8
The supreme court also determined that the injunction was not war-
ranted on any other basis. 419 The landowners argued that the county had
not complied with the requirement in article 3268(1) that money deposited
in the registry of the court as a part of the condemnation proceeding be
"subject to the order of the defendant," 420arguing that the money depos-
ited by Harris County was not apportioned among the various landowners
so as to be available for withdrawal by any one landowner. The supreme
court reasoned that Harris County had complied literally with article 3268
by depositing the money into the registry, that no case authority supported
the landowners, and that the landowners apparently had not tried to with-
draw their funds or agree with the other landowners on withdrawal.42'
Citing Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation District v. Allen422 for the
413. Id at 426.
414. Id.
415. 616 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. 1981).
416. Gordon v. Harris County, 603 S.W.2d 294, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980).
417. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3268(3) (Vernon 1968).
418. 616 S.W.2d at 168-69.
419. Id at 169-70.
420. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3268(1) (Vernon 1968) requires that the condemnor
pay the amount of the commissioners' award into the registry of the court, if the condemnor
wants to enter the land prior to completion of litigation.
421. 616 S.W.2d at 169.
422. 171 S.W.2d 842 (1943).
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proposition that the landowners had an adequate remedy at law by appeal,
the court also rejected the landowners' other grounds for a temporary in-
junction: (1) that the county's petition misnamed a party; (2) that the
county's notice did not attach a copy of the petition; (3) that one special
commissioner was improperly appointed; (4) that the county did not make
a good faith effort to agree on market value before commencing condem-
nation proceedings; and (5) that the county's original petition did not ad-
mit title in the landowners. 423 The supreme court reversed the court of
civil appeals, holding that it had abused its discretion in granting the tem-
porary injunction, and remanded to the trial court for proceedings on the
merits.424
In PGP Gas Products, Inc. v. Fariss425 PGP Gas Products sought to con-
demn a right-of-way easement for the construction and operation of a nat-
ural gas pipeline across the Farisses' land. The Farisses objected to the
commissioners' award of $6,000, but received a judgment of only $4,703 in
district court. On appeal by the Farisses, the Austin court of civil appeals
reversed for lack of evidence in the trial record that the commissioners had
taken the oath required by article 3264.426 The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the
Farisses had waived their complaint regarding the oath.427 The supreme
court stated that "[p]rocedural irregularities in proceedings before the spe-
cial commissioners can only be challenged on direct appeal. . . and are
waived if not properly preserved for appellate review. ' 428 The Farisses
had made general objections to PGP's failure to prove strict compliance
with condemnation procedures, but had not specifically directed the trial
court to the issue of the commissioners' oath. This general objection, the
supreme court said, was insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal be-
cause it did not adequately apprise the trial court of the deficiency
attacked. 429
In Allison v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. the supreme court held that an
action in trespass for damages occurring after the taking may properly be
joined and tried in a condemnation suit.430 Arkansas Louisiana Gas Com-
pany brought a condemnation proceeding to acquire a gas pipeline right-
of-way across the Allisons' timber land, and appealed the commissioners'
award to the trial court. The Allisons, in response, asserted a trespass
claim seeking additional damages resulting from Arkansas's clearing an
additional ten-foot strip and pushing debris off the right-of-way and onto
the Allisons' land. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for
the Allisons in the amounts of $1,000 on the trespass claim and $18,000 as
423. 616 S.W.2d at 169-70.
424. Id at 170.
425. 620 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1981).
426. Fariss v. PGP Gas Prods., Inc., 606 S.W.2d 957, 959-60 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980). See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3264(3) (Vernon 1968).
427. 620 S.W.2d at 560-61.
428. Id at 561.
429. Id at 560.
430. 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1981).
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condemnation damages. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that
Texas law did not allow a tort action for damages occurring after the tak-
ing to be tried with the condemnation Suit. 4 3 ' The supreme court reformed
the judgment of the court of civil appeals so as to affirm the trial court's
judgment awarding trespass damages. 432 The supreme court held that "the
present rule allowing joinder of claims433 is dispositive of the matter and
that an action in tort for damages after the taking may be maintained in a
condemnation suit."'434
The only legislative action during the survey period was the Texas Leg-
islature's 1981 amendment of article 3266a 435 of the eminent domain stat-
utes. Article 3266a clarifies which court has jurisdiction over an eminent
domain case and establishes the following:
(1) When a county has no county court at law with jurisdiction over
eminent domain proceedings and there is one district court, the district
court has jurisdiction.
(2) When a county has no county court at law with jurisdiction and there
are two or more district courts, the district clerk assigns eminent domain
proceedings to the district court in rotation.
(3) When there is one county court at law with jurisdiction, it has juris-
diction of eminent domain proceedings.
(4) When there are two or more county courts at law with jurisdiction,
the county clerk assigns eminent domain proceedings to the county courts
at law in rotation.436
The court of civil appeals considered a number of condemnation cases
during the survey period.437 The Dallas court of civil appeals considered
431. 620 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981).
432. 624 S.W.2d at 568. The supreme court found no reversible error in Arkansas's
points complaining of evidentiary rulings. d at 567.
433. TEx. R. Civ. P. 51(a).
434. 624 S.W.2d at 568.
435. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. Am. art. 3266a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
436. Id
437. See also Tejas Gas Corp. v. Magers, 619 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1981, no writ) (cross-examination of construction superintendent concerning construction
practices proper and evidence supported jury's verdict in favor of condemnees); Stein v.
Texas Power & Light Co., 619 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (appellant-condemnee had abandoned her objections to the commissioners' award by
waiting almost twelve years to set the matter for hearing and by withdrawing the commis-
sioners' award from the registry of the court); Smith v. Gulf States Utils. Co. 616 S.W.2d 300
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (trial court's denial of temporary in-
junction enjoining condemnors from taking possession of land affirmed when service of no-
tice of commissioners' hearing was adequate, deposit of condemnation award into registry of
court was properly done, land sought to be condemned was properly described and good
faith negotiations had taken place); Perry Gas Transmission, Inc. v. Vest, 609 S.W.2d 816
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ) (evidence sufficient to supprt judgent of
$252,726.06 based upon jury's findings of loss of market value of strip ofland condemned
and of damages to remainder of condemnee's ranch); City of Longview v. Wilson, 612
S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence concerning splash-
ing of water from street onto and into remainder of property, concerning a contract of sale
covering the remainder, and indicating that the condemnee's expert had considered future
projected income in arriving at his opinion on the value of the remainder, all reasonably
contributed to a determination of market value and were properly admitted); Svoboda v.
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an inverse condemnation case in City of Dallas v. Ludwick.438 Ludwick
owned six lots within the city of Dallas that together formed a somewhat
rectangular tract. In 1971 Ludwick learned that Dallas planned to widen a
street adjoining this tract; the necessary right-of-way required a building
offset line restricting the use of Ludwick's property. In 1974 Ludwick sub-
mitted an application to the city for a permit to construct an 80' x 220'
building on all six lots of the tract. This application was denied because
the building would be in the proposed right-of-way. Ludwick resubmitted
the application, changing the dimensions of the building to 80' x 180', re-
ceived the city's approval, and constructed the building. Ludwick learned
in 1977 that Dallas had abandoned its plans to widen the adjoining street.
Ludwick filed an inverse condemnation suit alleging that Dallas's denial of
his application to build the larger building constituted a taking under arti-
cle 1, section 17 of the Texas Constitution.439 The trial court rendered
judgment for damages on a jury verdict for Ludwick. The Dallas court of
civil appeals reversed and rendered."h 0 For Ludwick to recover, the court
stated that he "must show that the city denied his application for a build-
ing permit in contemplation of taking his land in the future for public use
and that such denial was the proximate cause of his alleged damages." 4 1
The court held that there was no evidence that Dallas's denial of the appli-
cation was the proximate cause of any damage to Ludwick, because the
evidence showed conclusively that Ludwick could have relocated the 80' x
220' building on his tract of land without suffering any inconvenience or
diminished utility as a result. 42
Houston's attempt to condemn land already devoted to a public use was
at issue in City of Houston v. Fort Worth & Denver Railway Co. 4 3 The city
State, 612 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (trial court properly denied bill
of review to reverse condemnation judgment when condemnees who had failed to object to
commissioners' award were not prevented by the condemnor from doing so; only available
remedy when judgment did not conform to commissioners' award is through mandamus or
direct attack); Svoboda v. State, 612 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ)
(when condemnees did not file timely objections to commissioners' award in county court,
condemnees had no right of appeal to court of civil appeals notwithstanding that the judg-
ment entered by the county court did not conform to the award); Phillips Pipeline Co. v.
Woods, 610 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (trial
court's decision in favor of condemnee on jurisdictional issues reversed; condemnor had
right to condemn land for pipeline that was to carry an ethane propane mixture, condemnor
had complied with the statutory condemnation procedure, and the condemnees' appearance
at the commissioners' hearing waived any complaint condemnees might have had as to lack
of good faith negotiations prior to the filing of the condemnation proceeding); County of
Nueces v. Floyd, 609 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)
(consent by a landowner to an entry on his land for the purpose of the construction of a
public work operates as waiver of right to recover the land, to enjoin the work, or to recover
damages for the taking; however, consent to such an entry does not constitute a waiver of the
landowner's constitutional right thereafter to recover for the damaging of his land by the
public body).
438. 620 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
439. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
440. 620 S.W.2d at 632.
441. Id (citing State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1941)).
442. 620 S.W.2d at 631-32.
443. 619 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of Houston filed suit against the Fort Worth & Denver Railway Company
seeking a writ of possession or, alternatively, condemnation for street pur-
poses, of land owned in fee by the railroad and used for tracks and rail-
road yards. After a jury trial the trial court entered judgment awarding
Houston an easement and the railroad $84,770 for expenses it would incur
as a result of the easement. Both parties appealed. The court of civil ap-
peals held that: (1) Houston was required to condemn the easement and
was not entitled to seek a writ of possession;444 (2) the railroad's recovery
could only be for the "diminished value for railroad purposes of the
[r]ailroad's exclusive use of land taken caused by its use for street pur-
poses," and that therefore it was error to allow recovery for actual ex-
penses incurred by the railroad as a result of the easement, which expenses
would have to be borne by the railroad;445 and (3) Houston had not vio-
lated the Commerce Clause.446 The court also discussed the conditions
under which a condemning authority could condemn property already de-
voted to public use: "Plainly stated, if a condemning authority seeks to
condemn property already devoted to a public use, it may not do so if the
effect of the taking would be to practically destroy the existing use, (1) un-
less the condemnor shows that its use is of paramount importance to the
public, and (2) that its purpose cannot be accomplished in any other prac-
tical way."447 Houston obtained a jury finding that its use was of "para-
mount importance," but the jury also found that there was another
practical way to accomplish the proposed street crossing. The railroad,
however, only obtained a jury finding that the taking would "materially
impair" the existing use by the railroad; the court found that this finding
did not satisfy the requirement that to avoid the taking, the condemnee
must prove that the existing use would be "practically destroyed." 448 The
court held that neither party was entitled to judgment.449
In McCullough v. Producers Gas Co.450 the issue was whether the con-
demnees could recover attorney's fees, appraiser's fees, and other expenses
after the condemnor dismissed its original condemnation proceedings and
then refiled condemnation proceedings covering the identical lands. The
Producers Gas Company filed condemnation proceedings in the summer
of 1979, and commissioners' awards were entered after hearings at which
the condemnees did not appear, allegedly because of inadequate notice.
The condemnees then sought to enjoin Producers from entering their prop-
erty. In response, Producers filed new condemnation proceedings on the
identical lands, and later dismissed the original condemnation proceed-
ings. The condemnees asked the district court to award them attorney's
fees, appraiser's fees and other expenses pursuant to article 3265, subdivi-
444. Id. at 236.
445. Id
446. Id at 238.
447. Id at 237.
448. Id
449. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded. Id at 238.
450. 616 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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sion 6.451 A settlement was reached granting Producers an easement, and
as a part of the settlement the new condemnation proceedings also were
dismissed. The condenees, however, pursued their claims for fees and
expenses in district court. The district court denied any relief, but on ap-
peal the Waco court of civil appeals reversed and remanded. 452 The court
of civil appeals read subdivision 6 of article 3265, as amended effective
May 17, 1979, as providing "that where a condemnor after filing a petition
in condemnation desires to and does dismiss or abandon the proceedings,
upon motion filed to the judge of the court, the court upon hearing thereu-
pon shall make an allowance for certain necessary and reasonable ex-
penses. ' 453 The court noted that the 1979 amendment made the award of
expenses mandatory rather than discretionary, and held that since the ele-
ments of the statute were fulfilled in the case at bar, the trial court was
obliged to make some award to condemnees. 454
The Fort Worth court of civil appeals rejected the condemnor's objec-
tions to an allegedly excessive judgment in City of Fort Worth v. Beau-
pre.455 The city of Fort Worth condemned a fee simple of approximately
one-third of a vacant lot zoned for commercial use but subject to deed
restrictions limiting its use to single family dwellings. The commissioners
awarded $18,800 as compensation for the taking. The condemnees filed
their objections, and the trial court rendered judgment upon jury findings
that the condemnees recover $85,157.42 minus the $18,800. The Fort
Worth court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that (1) the trial court's in-
struction on market value was proper;456 (2) although the admission into
evidence of sales of improved properties by condemnees' expert as "com-
parable sales" was error because the condemned land was unimproved, the
error was not reversible because four sales of unimproved property were
also admitted;457 (3) although it was error to admit testimony about an
unaccepted oral offer for the subject property, no reversible error was com-
mitted because the offer did not form the primary basis for the testimony
of the witness regarding value;458 and (4) evidence was presented to sup-
port the jury's verdict on damages and that other points of error were
invalid. 459
451. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3265, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
452. 616 S.W.2d at 706.
453. Id at 705.
454. Id at 705-06. The court expressed no opinion as to whether the condemnees were
entitled to treble recovery under the statute. Id at 706.
455. 617 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
456. Id at 830-31. Fort Worth requested instructions emphasizing the effect of the deed
restrictions on the value of the property. Id at 830. The trial court submitted the language
approved in City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 267 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1954), and the court of civil
appeals stated that such language "apprised the jury that consideration should not only be
given to the presently existing deed restrictions but consideration should also be given to the
reasonable probability, if any, that the subject property would become available for com-
mercial use in the reasonable future." 617 S.W.2d at 830-31.
457. 617 S.W.2d at 831.
458. Id
459. Id at 831-33.
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Finally, the important question of the relationship between a city's zon-
ing and condemnation powers was considered in Austin v. City of Lub-
bock.460 In March 1977, the city of Lubbock instituted condemnation
proceedings to acquire portions of the Austins' lot on which their home
was located in order to improve a heavily traveled intersection in an area
zoned for single family dwellings. Lubbock's zoning provisions required a
side yard with a minimum width of ten feet; the strip condemned by Lub-
bock left the Austins a side yard four and three-tenths feet wide. The trial
court awarded title to the condemned land to Lubbock and $8,650 in com-
pensation to the Austins. On appeal, the Austins argued that the taking
was impermissible because it was in violation of Lubbock's own zoning
ordinance. The Amarillo court of civil appeals held that under the facts
Lubbock had improperly exercised its eminent domain power.461 The
court stated the threshold question to be one never before resolved in
Texas: "whether a city can ignore its zoning ordinance when exercising its
eminent domain power."'462 The court determined that the proper rule was
that "a city exercising its eminent domain power in derogation of its zon-
ing ordinance is not prohibited from doing so unless the objecting party
can show that the action is unreasonable or arbitrary. '463 The court noted
that the jury specifically found that Lubbock abused its discretion in tak-
ing the Austins' property, and held that the trial court erred in disregard-
ing this finding.464 The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded for
adjudication of the Austins' claims regarding attorney's fees and
damages.465
460. 618 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981). In the course of the printing of
this article the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 167 (February 6, 1982). The supreme court
stated that "a city exercising its eminent domain power is not bound by its own zoning
ordinance unless the objecting party can show that the condemnation is unreasonable or
arbitrary." Id at 167. The determination of reasonableness or arbitrariness was held by the
court to be a question of law. Id at 168.
461. 618 S.W.2d at 555.
462. Id at 554.
463. Id at 555.
464. Id
465. Id. at 556.
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